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3PART I INTRODUCTION
The thesis Is essentially an attempt to establish a comprehensive theory 
of consciousness, being and knowable reality that Is fu lly  consistent both 
w ith  all the analytic arguments that can be brought to bear In formulating 
such a theory and w ith the whole of the relevant scientific and other 
empirical evidence.
It Is considered that such a theory would very probably be an extension of 
the traditional Identity Theory that a •mental' state Is Identical to a 
•physical' state and consequently the analysis Is directed In PART II to 
recapitulating the analytic case put forward In support of that theory and 
evaluating the principal such arguments against It.
Next, In PART III, elements of the scientific  and other empirical evidence 
that are considered particularly pertinent to the analysis are referred to 
and evaluated In some depth where this is considered appropriate.
Then, in PART IV, the theory derived as an outcome of all the 
considerations Is explicated as an ontology of consciousness, being and 
knowable reality. It is designated as the deterministic identity theory on 
the grounds that determinism and the Identity thesis are found from those 
considerations to be principal elements of the theory.
The claim that quantum phenomena are evidence of some kind of 
ontological Indeterminacy In the functioning of the sub-atomic realm and 
thereby that s tr ic t Individual determinism Is not a true representation of 
the functioning of the Universe Is given particular attention In the 
analysis In view of the many philosophical theories which have, one way or 
the other, relted upon It to establish that the Universe Is not a to ta lly  
deterministic and therefore monistic entity or system, i.e., one 
functioning to ta lly In accordance w ith  the one 'principle' or set of laws.
It Is widely held that the 'appearance' of determinism as the mode of 
functioning of the macro realm Is accounted for by sta tistica l instead of 
Individual determinacy. Some philosophers, e.g., the nuclear scientist 
Eddington in his philosophising mode, have even taken the extreme -  and it  
would seem nonsensical - step of contending that the rejection of the 
principle of determinism In so far as the functioning of the sub-atomic 
micro realm Is concerned provides an adequate basts for propounding the 
truth of free w ill In the realm of human behaviour. Randomness, 
breakdown of logical relationships In the course of events and thereby 
meaninglessness would surely be the outcome.
4Various lines of argument are very much against holding the above 
anti-individual determinism beliefs w ith any degree of conviction and can 
be held to indicate that the probability of s tric t individual determinism 
being true is much greater than that of its  being false. The various lines 
of argument are detailed in PART III and i t  is concluded therein that the 
case for ontological indeterminacy at any level of existence of the 
Universe - micro, macro or as a whole - is without significant 
substantiation. Reference is also made there to an increasing number of 
eminent scientists and philosophers who have reached the same 
conclusion, e.g., Einstein, Planck, Schroedinger, Bohm and, most recently, 
Hawking and Honderich.
Having established that the probability of s tr ic t individual determinism 
being true is much greater than that of its  being false or even that of 
statistico determinism, the significance of that truth is then analysed. If 
s tr ic t individual determinism (hereafter referred to merely as 
determinism unless the qualification is of value to the particular text) is 
true, the Universe cannot be other than a single monistic entity as far as 
knowable reality is concerned, i.e., an entity functioning in accordance 
w ith a single 'principle' or set of laws, since an entity that functions and 
is entirely interrelated deterministically cannot know or be affected by 
any other entity. All states, properties and events - mentalistic, 
physicalistic or whatever - cannot then be other than states, properties 
and events of this one entity reached and interrelated deterministically 
and no form of irreducible supervenience or emergence can occur.
Certainly, substance and/or property interactionary dualism involving an 
element of bi-directional causal interaction between separate mentalistic 
and physicalistic substances and/or properties - whether completely 
independent or merely irreducibly supervenient in some way, one upon the 
other or irreducibly emergent in some way, one from the other- and 
epiphenomenalism involving unidirectional causal interaction - could be 
simulated as a consequence of some kind of separation into two distinctly 
different streams, deterministically interrelated within the overall 
deterministic system but nevertheless such that they could be described 
as separate mentalistic and physicalistic substances end/or properties.
However, any such occurrence would not be a departure from what is 
appropriately designated herein as the theory of deterministic monism. 
Determinism is a total statement regarding the structure and functioning 
of the Universe, implying both monism and total compliance w ith the one 
set of laws of functioning and interrelationship. It therefore excludes all
5forms of dualism which claim the existence of essentially separate 
substances, properties or whatever, functioning largely or entirely in 
accordance w ith fundamentally different sets of laws. Different streams 
w ith widely different characteristics could occur but they would s t i l l  be 
ports of the one monistic, deterministically functioning system - and 
never anything else.
In any case, i t  is further concluded in PART III that there is no 
demonstrable scientific or other empirical evidence to the effect that any 
such complex differentiation into two distinctly different streams 
occurs which could be described as separate mentalistic and physicolistic 
streams. The empirical evidence is all to the effect that the principle of 
Occam’s Razor applies and that nothing more is required for the 
occurrence of a particular mentalistic state, i.e., a particular ’experience’ 
or form of consciousness, than the occurrence of a particular 
physicalistic state. According to all the empirical evidence that can be 
brought to bear on the subject, the two states are one and the same state 
picked out by different modes and hence the identity thesis is endorsed in 
the most direct terms.
As an outcome of all the considerations, an extension of the theory of 
deterministic monism is formulated in PART IV. It is designated as the 
deterministic identity theory on the grounds that s tr ic t individual 
determinism and the identity thesis are essential elements and is 
presented as a comprehensive ontology of consciousness, being and 
knowable reality that goes much beyond the more general statement made 
by the theory of deterministic monism.
The deterministic identity theory states that the fundamental 
constitution of the Universe is a single, universal 'substance' or force; 
that the structure and functioning of the Universe accords with the 
principles of monism, determinism and conservation of energy; and that a 
'mental' state of a part of the Universe is identical to a 'physical' state of 
that part, the ’mental' state being picked out and known a priori and 
incorrigibly and the 'physical' state being picked out and known a 
posteriori and contingently.
The essential point is that the Universe is a single, deterministically 
functioning entity or system, structured fundamentally on the basis of 
some kind of universal commonality, and that the occurrence of a 
particular mental state of a part of the Universe, i.e., any of the 
'experiences' thought, desire, fear, pain, sense of self etc in the case of a 
human being, is identically the occurrence of a particular physical state
6of that part. The two states are nothing other than different modes of 
picking out, reportings, meanings and knowings of one and the same 
referent, the ultimate reality being in the fundamental properties of the 
Universe which give rise to those particular modes, reportings, meanings 
and knowings and in nothing else.
A number of highly significant statements follow from the theory of 
deterministic monism and its  extension, the deterministic identity theory 
and are developed in appropriate detail in the body of the thesis.
(1) The Universe can be fu lly represented by a single mathematical 
expression w ith only the one variable term t.
(2) All states of the Universe are merely different forms of the one 
entity.
(3) No form of irreducible supervenience or emergence can ever occur.
(4) Any state of any level of existence of any part of the Universe, e.g., the 
holistic state of consciousness of human beings, is theoretically reducible 
to, i.e., explainable in terms of, the state of any other level of existence 
of the part.
(5) The world is fundamentally not a collection of discrete ’objects' - the 
standard view of all forms of so-called revealed religion - but is a single 
monistic entity wherein all forms of individuality are facets or nodal 
concentrations of some kind of universal commonality.
(6) The human brain - and presumably its  rudimentary or developed 
equivalent in other animals - is reported, known and described in different 
terms depending upon the particular mode whereby i t  is picked out. One of 
these modes is the mentalistic mode, the brain then being known a priori 
and incorrigibly, and the other is the physicalistic mode, the brain then 
being known only a posteriori and contingently. The distinctive difference 
of meaning between the mentalistic and physicalistic reportings and 
descriptions of the brain is then that of the difference of meaning 
between a priori and a posteriori reportings of one and the same entity.
(7) The sense of self is a particular form of cognitive consciousness - 
that which is identical, in the case of human beings, to a state of the 
brain when frontal lobes are an effective integral part.
(8) Thought, emotion and behaviour are functions solely of phylogenetic 
and environmental forces.
(9) Knowledge is lim ited to what is reachable by the deterministic 
evolutionary process.
The above statements of the content and implications of the deterministic 
identity theory are of course merely an inkling - or perhaps an outline - of 
what may well be the ultimate content and implications of such a theory 
as science penetrates ever further into the most fundamental realms of
7existence ond philosophy continues to carry out one of Its most Important 
designated roles today - that of fleshing out the discoveries of science 
and relating these to everyday human affairs as illustrated to a minor 
extent in PART V relative to certain important issues. It is argued that 
there is no realm of knowable reality or fie ld of scientific, philosophical 
or religious concern which is beyond the scope and relevance of a theory 
such as that of the deterministic identity theory and thereby legitimately 
beyond the reach of analysis further to the content of the present thesis.
It is fina lly concluded in PART VI that an entirely new era of 
understanding and religious belief lies ahead for human beings - and 
perhaps also a new kind of human being.
8PART II PROLEGOMENON
2. The traditional Identity Theory
2.1 Introduction
Complete one-to-one Identity of a mental and a physical state In 
accordance w ith  Leibniz’s Law of the Indlscernablllty of Identicals Is 
claimed by the progenitors of the Identity Theory for the relationship 
between a state of ‘experience’, i.e., a 'mental' state, and a state of the 
part of the body which Is held to be the location of ’mental’ phenomena. 
This part Is taken by various philosophers to be the body as a whole, the 
brain or the central nervous system.
Under this condition, the question of whether or not separate entitles are 
Involved does not arise. The one referent Is merely being described In 
different terms appropriate to the particular relationship w ith the world 
external to the referent. For example, the same star Is described or 
reported as the Morning or the Evening Star under particular positional 
conditions and the same electrical occurrence Is described or reported as 
lightning or an electrical discharge In the sky depending upon the point of 
view of the observer.
In the same way, the 'mind' and the brain or the central nervous system are 
held by the Identity theorists to Involve merely different modes of 
description or reporting of one and the same referent and other modes 
could therefore occur. If we extend the Identity Theory reductlvely 
further, notable other physlcallstlc modes would be the referent described 
as 'a particular assemblage of biological cells and Interrelationships', 'a 
particular assemblage of molecules and Interrelationships', 'a particular 
assemblage of sub-atomic particles and Interrelationships' and, at the 
most fundamental level, 'a particular concentration, node or localisation 
of the fundamental force or 'substance' of the Universe. Heisenberg calls 
this fundamental 'substance' of the Universe "energy" but the term 
obviously has other connotations which make It quite unsuitable for the 
purpose.
It would be a corollary of this to ta lly  reductive situation that a particular 
mentallstlc state, I.e., a particular 'experience' such as a state of thought, 
pain, desire etc, Is Identical to a state of a particular concentration, node 
or localisation of the fundamental 'substance' of the Universe.
On this basis, the very concept of the mind as being something empirically
9real in its  own right is a corrupting misnomer in that i t  suggests and 
lends im p lic it support to the dualistic concept of a non-physical, i.e., 
spiritual entity which is independent of the body in some structural and 
functional way. According to the identity thesis, no such independent 
entity exists.
Ryle makes this point when he claims that "...there is a considerable 
logical hazard in using the nouns 'mind' and 'minds' at all. The idiom makes 
i t  too easy to construct logically improper conjunctions, disjunctions and 
cause-effect propositions..."^
It can be argued that this is all that the so-called mind-body problem 
requires - that the problem is not a scientific but a linguistic one and 
terms more appropriate to the empirical relationships would solve the 
problem completely. Indeed this is precisely the reconciliation of mental 
and physical terms that the truth of the identity thesis would ultimately 
engender; the category difference between mental and physical terms 
which are currently so troublesome in formulating a convincing case for 
the identity thesis would be eliminated.
However, to authenticate such an approach to the mind-body problem 
would require much more empirical knowledge regarding 'mental' as 
distinct from 'physical' interpretations than is at present available and 
such an approach would currently be li t t le  more than a play upon words.
It has also been argued that the identity thesis is seriously lacking in that 
i t  does not reflect the holistic or Gestalt phenomenon of self-awareness 
as a discrete individual being. According to this argument, an identity 
relationship between the 'mental' and the 'physical' as evidenced by a 
multitude of conditioning, surgical and neurophysiological empirical 
relationships is s till a highly inadequate, indeed meagre, representation 
of the empirical situation.
So where do we go? Giving the 'mind' the status of a separate dualistic 
entity is unacceptable as being against the empirical evidence and the 
Identity Theory as propounded by Place, Feigl and Smart is held to be an 
incomplete theory as not taking account of the highly significant 
empirical fact of self-awareness or !-ness. There appears to be no fu lly 
satisfying answer which, no doubt, is one of the reasons why there has 
been such a proliferation of papers dealing w ith the identity theory and 
alternative theories.
Papers which, i t  is considered here, have added something of value to the
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more comprehensive approach as taken In the present study, are referred 
to In the next section.
2.2 History and trends
It would be possible to detail a very considerable number of papers which 
profess a more complete and Inarguable version of the whole or some 
particular aspect of the traditional Identity Theory than that previously 
presented but l i t t le  would be gained by doing so. In conjunction, the papers 
by Place,(1) F e ig l(2) and Sm art(3) are generally held to provide a detailed 
and authoritative presentation of the theory. Smart's presentation Is given 
precedence these days In that It addresses aspects of the theory which are 
considered to have been le ft unresolved In the papers by Place and Feigl. 
Smart's line of argument Is reproduced In section 2.3 below as part of a 
sequential analysis of the theory and the most Influential arguments put 
forward against It.
Two exceptions to the above dismissal (for the purposes of this study) of 
papers other than those by Place, Feigl and Smart 1n providing support for 
the traditional Identity Theory can however be referred to In that they 
bear somewhat upon the thesis of the present study. The papers are those 
by Lewis entitled 'An Argument for the Identity Theory'(4) and by Medlln 
entitled 'Ryle and the Mechanical Hypothesis'.(5) Both look specifically to 
the empirical evidence to provide support for the rationalist arguments 
even though In neither case do they detail any of that evidence as Is done 
In PART III below.
The particular value of Lewis's paper In terms of the thesis of the present 
study lies In two of his claims; f irs tly , that "...the theory governing any 
physical phenomenon Is explained by theories governing phenomena out of 
which that phenomenon is composed and by the way It Is composed out of 
them. The same Is true of the la tte r phenomena, and so on down to 
fundamental particles or fields governed by a few simple laws, more or 
less as conceived of In present-day theoretical phys1cs."(6) and, secondly, 
that "A confidence In the explanatory adequacy of physics Is a vita l part, 
but not the whole, of any full-blooded materialism. It Is the empirical 
foundation on which materialism builds Its superstructure of ontological 
and cosmological doctrines, among them the identity theory. It Is also a 
traditional and definitive working hypothesis of natural science - what 
scientists say nowadays to the contrary Is defeatism or philosophy. I 
argue that whoever shares this confidence must accept the identity 
theory."(7)
Lewis's assertions are a clear statement looking positively to the 
empirical evidence to provide support for the Identity thesis, additional to 
the analytic arguments of the traditional Identity theorists who are
12
concerned primarily w ith establishing that the Identity Theory is not 
false a priori. However, Lewis does not attempt to develop his line of 
thought further and identify elements of the empirical evidence which 
could provide specific support for the identity thesis. As a result, his 
paper can be seen only as pointing the way to a more detailed study of the 
empirical evidence and the possible derivation of a more comprehensive 
theory than that of the traditional Identity Theory.
The essence of Medlin's thesis is twofold. Firstly, he questions the 
valid ity of the common belief that some 'mental' states are not identically 
'physical' states and accounts for the incidence of the belief as being 
merely an outcome of what he calls "direct awareness".^ He points out 
that knowing one is in a particular state is not to know i t  as a physical 
condition and he claims that i t  is this lack of insight which leads to the 
knower believing that the particular state is something other than a 
physical state.
Secondly, having rejected the notion that phenomena exist which are not 
physical states, Medlin declares that this in itse lf is a general theory of 
mind. However, as he sees it ,  the theory says nothing regarding the state 
described as physical and this question must also be answered before a 
complete theory of mind is reached.
It is here that Medlin turns to the empirical evidence for clarification and 
makes the following statement; "It is my opinion that we already have 
overwhelming evidence for the belief that all biological movement ((which 
he elsewhere identifies w ith behaviour)) is explicable in 
physico-chemical terms.*9) and follows in a way which is "more or less 
determinate'*10) from the physico-chemical state. He claims that this 
determinate relationship is enough to validate the theory of Central State 
Materialism forthwith.
On this basis, the identity thesis follows as a corollary of Central State 
Materialism, according to Medlin. The only question remaining is that of 
the specific location of the physico-chemical states which are the causes 
of the behaviour. He believes that the central nervous system is that 
location except perhaps for emotions which involve the autonomic nervous 
system.
Both Lewis and Medlin are looking specifically to the empirical evidence 
to provide support for the identity thesis additional to that of the analytic 
arguments of the identity theorists and it  is this total approach which in 
the present study is the basis fo r the formulation of a comprehensive
13
theory of consciousness, being and knowable reality.
The substitution of the term consciousness for the term mind In the above 
statement Is deliberate. As already pointed out In Section 2.1, the use of 
the term mind In a commonly expressed wording of the identity theory that 
mind and body are Identical Is clearly a misstatement. Smart has kept on 
emphasising -  without much success It would seem In philosophical 
circles according to K1m(11)-  that It Is a state of 'experience' which is 
Identical to a state of the body when a 'mental' state Is said to be 
Identical w ith  a ‘physical* state, not. some kind of entity which could be 
called the mind; and, since a state of 'experience' Is nothing other than a 
state of consciousness, It follows that a state of consciousness -  in every 
form, either as a state of emotion or a state of thought -  1s Identical to a 
state of the body according to the theory. In particular, i t  follows that the 
process of thought Is Identical to a determ inistically related sequence of 
states of the body.
14
2.3 Content and objections
The section is f irs t  concerned w ith recapitulating the analytic line of 
argument leading to the traditional Identity Theory and then examining the 
objections which have been raised most prominently and to most effect 
against the theory. The earlier objections which appear to fa ll into this 
category are those raised by essentialists such as Kripke, incorrig ib ilists 
such as Baier and functionalists such as Boyd.
Also, since i t  has recently been put forward at an authoritative level as a 
reconciliation between determinism and a causal relationship between the 
'mental' and the 'physical', Honderich's 'Union Theory' is examined at 
appropriate length.
Finally, appropriate reference must also be made to certain recent 
attempts to usefully modify the basic identity thesis while s t ill 
maintaining its  essential features.
A particular element of the case put forward by the progenitors of the 
traditional Identity Theory, i.e., Place, Feigl and Smart, is that statements 
of empirical identity - which Smart claims are always refutable since we 
can never know any empirical event w ith certainty - are necessarily 
"factual and contingent" as he puts it ;  they are subject to modification or 
replacement in the light of further empirical evidence and therefore we 
are not in a position to te ll from the meanings of the terms alone that an 
identity exists. In particular, the lack of intertronslatabi 1 ity  of the 
mental and physical descriptions is not an argument against the identity 
thesis. Being differently sourced, the differences between the mental and 
physical descriptions and the differences between the mental and physical 
languages imply nothing either for or against the proposition that the two 
states are identical and there is no case for arguing that reports of 
mental events must have the same ostensible meaning as reports of the 
correlating physical process. A contingent statement of identity entails 
no such requirement.
Smart notes that there is an inclination to say that the distinctive 
difference of meaning between the mental and physical descriptions - 
which must be present i f  the statement of identity of a mental state with 
a physical state is only contingently true - is "an irreducible, emergent, 
introspectible property".^ Such a difference would be inconsistent with 
the identity thesis in that there cannot be distinctive properties, only 
distinctive descriptions or reportings if  a mental state is identical to a 
physical state and he claims that he "gets round this objection"1^  by
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arguing that, in the case of such an identity, reports of mental events are 
topic-neutral and say nothing regarding the properties of the underlying 
constitution. Consequently, they do not imply either an identity 
interpretation or a dualism interpretation involving physical and 
"irreducibly psychical“ entities. The identity interpretation is, however, in 
his opinion, more logical "mainly because of Occam's razor. It seems to me 
that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are 
able to be seen as physico-chemical mechanisms.“^
Smart provides an appropriate example of the meaning of the term 
topic-neutrality as he uses i t  when he says “ If my view is correct, we do 
notice brain processes, though only in a 'topic-neutral' way: we do not 
notice that they are brain processes."^ According to this line of 
argument, a statement or description regarding a particular mental state, 
e.g., pain, is a topic-neutral statement or description and says nothing 
regarding the physical properties of the correlated physical state - which 
is conventionally taken to be C-fibre stimulation - although the two 
states are one and the same state.
Smart's line of argument based upon topic-neutrality, Occam's Razor and 
recourse to the empirical evidence is not convincing. It makes his analytic 
arguments inconclusive and li t t le  more than ancillary to the empirical 
explanation. One can understand why philosophers have tended to turn 
away from the identity theory to property dualism; they have even been 
pointed in that direction by Smart's d ifficu lty  in finding an argument that 
would effectively refute the case for taking the 'mental' to be a distinct 
property of the brain.
A difference of meaning between the mental and physical descriptions of 
the brain that would appear to be more acceptable than that of Smart's 
explanation based upon topic-neutrality is that based upon the different 
modes whereby the brain is specifically picked out, reported, described 
and known. On the one hand, there is the a priori incorrig ib ility  of the 
’mental' mode and, on the other, the a posteriori contingency of the 
'physical' mode, the difference of meaning between mentalistic and 
physicalistic descriptions and reportings of the brain being therefore that 
between a priori and a posteriori reportings of one and the same entity. 
Without the a priori incorrig ib ility  of one's own 'experience', there would 
be nothing whatever to prove that the Universe is characterised in any 
way by the 'mental', that the statement of identity of a mental state and a 
physical state is a meaningful statement dealing w ith a real relationship 
and that a complete account of the structure and functioning of the living 
world is not given by the theory of Behaviourism.
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Armstrong is another who is not satisfied with Smart's particular line of 
argument based upon topic-neutrality and involves himself in a long 
dissertation to find a more acceptable difference of meaning between the 
mental and physical terms of the statement of identity - in particular, a 
meaning of the term mental that, once again, does not imply dualistic 
overtones of some kind rather than different modes of picking out and 
knowing the brain.(4)
The dissertation is of l i t t le  significance vis-a-vis the present study. 
Enough to note that Armstrong’s dissatisfaction, not w ith the identity 
theory per se, but w ith the completeness of the analytic arguments put 
forward in support of the theory, is typical of the varying levels and 
modes of dissatisfaction of many others. Scarcely anyone, other than 
out-and-out traditional identity theorists, appears to be fu lly  convinced 
by the logic of the arguments put forward to establish that the statement 
of identity of a mental state and a physical state is not false a priori and 
that the statement can reasonably be held to be true, subject to final 
confirmation by further empirical evidence.
Further - as a requirement additional to that of a non-intertranslatable 
difference of meaning between mental and physical description - the 
terms of a statement of identity must be intersubstitutable i f
referentially transparent in the particular context i.e., i f  they refer 
directly to the referent concerned and not to the name or some other 
"oblique" or indirect reference to the referent. Quine makes this point 
clear in his paper, "Reference and Modality”, noting that
intersubstitutability of the terms of a statement of identity is only valid 
for identity statements wherein the terms are "purely re ferentia l".^ With 
this lim itation, intersubstitutability of the terms of a statement of 
identity is a valid requirement for any identity relationship which accords 
with Leibniz’s Law.
The problem for the traditional identity theorists in this regard was that 
the mental and physical terms show li t t le  possibility of such 
intersubstitutability and consequently provide l i t t le  evidence of the 
existence of a single referent. Whereas the terms gene and DNA molecule, 
Morning Star and Evening Star etc are intersubstitutable for each other in 
statements, it  appears to be beyond the realm of credibility to say that 
'Great C-fibre stimulation is too much to bear.' or that 'One can see the 
sensation of pain under a microscope.' yet such statements must be 
meaningful and not nonsensical if  the identity of mental and physical 
states accords with Leibniz's Law.
17
The solution to the problem is held by the identity theorists to lie  in the 
future of human knowledge when the sides of the statement of identity of 
a mental and a physical state would be framed more clearly in terms 
which are purely referential or the meaning of the present terms changes 
to the point of making them purely referential.
Kripke makes a pertinent comment regarding the apparent deficiency; 
"The trouble is that the identity theorist does not hold that the physical 
state merely produces the mental state, rather he wishes the two to be 
identical and thus a fo rtio ri necessarily co-occurrent." ^
In effect, Kripke is also pointing here to the most commonly held 
objection to the traditional Identity Theory - that the terms of the 
statement of identity are not of the same logical type or category, i.e., 
not such that they are at least potentially intersubstitutable in 
accordance w ith the provisions of Leibniz’s Law and Quine's requirement 
of referential transparency; hence, that the statement does not have the 
authenticity of the heat/molecular motion, gene/DNA molecule, water/F^O
etc statements of identity where the terms of each statement are of the 
same logical category and are clearly intersubstitutable while at the 
same time having different meanings. For this reason, Kripke claims that a 
causal rather than an Identity relationship between mental and physical 
states would be more logically acceptable.
Kripke's line of argument against the valid ity of the analogies used by the 
identity theorists to illustra te what they claim is the relationship 
between the mental and the physical and, thereby, his line of argument 
against the validity of the identity thesis itse lf is worthy of being 
reproduced here since i t  contrasts most pointedly w ith the contingency 
argument upon which the traditional identity theorists depend in 
developing their case.
Also, it  would appear from the many references by other philosophers to 
his particular line of argument in rejecting the Identity Theory that the 
line of argument has been one of the factors which have directed many 
philosophers away from the identity Theory to property dualism as a more 
acceptable theory of the relationship between the 'mental' and the 
'physical'.
The basis of the contingency provision in Smart's statement of the 
identity of mental and physical states is that a statement of identity is
18
contingently and not necessarily true i f  i t  is not possible to establish its  
truth from the meanings of its  terms alone. This is evidently so in the 
case of a statement of empirical identity since the meanings of the terms 
never reflect a complete description of the referent in such a case and i t  
is never possible to conclude necessarily from the meanings of the terms 
that the statement of identity is true, i.e., that only one and the same 
referent is involved. On this basis, Smart claims that the statement that a 
mental state is identical to a physical state is of the same genre as that 
of the analogies, heat/molecular motion etc; they are all contingent, 
factual statements of identity.
However, Kripke disagrees with this claim. He argues that Smart is not 
entitled to assume that the statement of identity of mental and physical 
states is equivalent to those of the supposed analogies, heat/molecular 
motion etc. In the case of the analogies, the statement of identity is 
either necessarily true or i t  is false since one and the same referent is 
involved or i t  is not. The element of contingency in the statement of 
identity can reside only in the mode by which the heat/molecular motion 
referent, for example, is picked out, cognition that a state of heat exists 
being possibly due to a referent other than that of heat/molecular motion.
The statements of identity of heat/molecular motion etc are therefore 
known a posteriori and are refutable, necessary truths, according to 
Kripke.
Kripke argues that the statement that a mental state is identical to a 
physical state, i f  true, must sim ilarly be necessarily true since the states 
are then one and the same referent. Consequently, the contingency that is 
apparent in the statement of identity must reside elsewhere as in the 
case of the analogies. However, he claims that i t  cannot reside in the link 
between cognition and the referent as in the case of the analogies since 
cognition of the state of pain, for example, cannot be separated from the 
sensation of pain. They are one and the same thing, according to Kripke. 
Hence the contingency that is apparent in the statement of identity of the 
mental and physical states of pain can reside only in the relationship 
between the mental sensation and the physical counterpart and the 
statement of identity must be false.
Since sim ilar analyses of all other mental/physical relationships would 
produce the same result, i t  follows, according to Kripke, that the identity 
thesis must be false and the materialism thesis as a whole must be 
seriously questioned.
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It would appear that there may be considerable confusion here. It would 
appear to be a confusing of the issue to relate the mental/physical 
question only to internal, obviously highly complex and li t t le  understood 
relationships w ithin the brain as Kripke does. There is no apparent reason 
why the question should not be considered from the point of view of an 
external observer in exactly the same way as the analogies.
On this basis, the statement that a mental state is identical to a 
physical state, i f  true, is necessarily true as Kripke asserts for the 
analogies and the contingency apparent in the statement of identity is 
once again associated w ith the mode by which the referent is picked out 
by the external observer.
Similarly to the means employed by Kripke to emphasise the essentiality 
of the identity relationship in the case of the analogies, the statement of 
identity of mental and physical states can also be counterfaced by a 
statement of identity of mental and physical states in which one of the 
terms "does not designate rigidly", using Kripke’s expression for a term 
which represents a contingent and not a necessary property of the 
referent. A counterfacing statement of identity of this type is as follows; 
That which is evidenced in communication between human beings is 
identical to a brain process.’ In this case, communication is the contingent 
property of the referent by which the referent is picked out. Other sources 
of that communication, e.g., a mechanical source, could occur and the 
communication could be interpreted as being sourced other than in a brain 
process.
Smart and Armstrong direct an analytic argument against Kripke's 
assumption that cognition and sensation are one and the same state. As 
Smart puts it ,  "Both the materialist and the dualist, and indeed most 
behaviourists also, w ill want to say that the sincere reporting of a 
sensation is one thing and the sensation reported is another thing. Now, as 
Hume said, what is distinguishable is separable. It is therefore logically 
possible that someone should sincerely report an experience and yet that 
the experience should not occur."^7)
Armstrong is even more specific. "But in fact, the apprehension of 
something must be distinct from the thing apprehended. For if  not, we are
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faced w ith a flagrant circularity. Having a pain logically Involves 
apprehension of -  what? The pain Itself! This Is as bad as saying that to be 
a cat logically Involves being the offspring of cats. It seems, therefore, 
that there must always be a distinction between being In a mental state 
and being aware that we are In that state. Hence there can be no 
Indubitable Introspective knowledge.”*8*
Armstrong particularises the same point In his statement, "But I t  seems 
clear that the natural view to take Is that pain and awareness of pain are 
’distinct existences'. If so, a false awareness of pain Is at least logically 
poss1ble."(9)
In claiming that separability of cognition or cognitive awareness and 
sensation or sensory stimulation Is always at least logically possible, 
Smart and Armstrong are of course rejecting Krlpke’s assumption that 
cognition and sensation are one and the same state.
Finally, In the case of the mental/physical relationship, there is 
considerable empirical evidence against Krlpke’s assumption that 
cognition and sensation are one and the same state. In assuming that there 
Is a causal and not an Identity relationship between mental and physical 
states, Krlpke Is at least assuming that cognition and sensation correlate 
w ith brain processes and It Is highly relevant to note that the empirical 
evidence Indicates that cognition and sensation do not correlate w ith  one 
and the same brain process.
The empirical evidence presented by Gardner*10* Is particularly 
Informative In Indicating that the brain process correlating w ith cognition 
Is different from the brain process correlating w ith sensation, the link 
between the two processes being modifiable or Interruptible In a variety 
of ways -  by Innate disability, damage, surgical operation etc. By such 
means, cognition of a sensory condition, e.g., that Involved in the 
occurrence of the sensory state of pain, can be diminished or eliminated. 
Cognition of such a sensory condition can also occur or be Induced without 
the sensory condition actually being present.
In view of all these considerations directed against Krlpke's a priori 
assumption that cognitive and sensory states of the brain are one and the 
same state, It would appear that his line of argument against the Identity 
thesis can be seriously questioned since It depends upon that assumption.
The Incorrig ib ility argument against the Identity thesis Is that the 
relationship between sensation and cognition or cognitive awareness of
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sensation is Incorrigible whereas the link between the brain process 
Involved In sensation and the self-scanning brain process Involved In 
cognition of sensation "can fa ll to operate properly", using Armstrong's 
expression for the situation.
Two lines of argument can be directed against the notion of Incorrig ib ility  
as applied against the Identity thesis, these being very much the same as 
those directed above against Kripke's assumption that cognition and 
sensation are one and the same state.
Thus, the f ir s t  line of argument against the Incorrig ib ility  thesis Is that 
the Incorrlg lb illsts are not entitled to lim it their claim to Internal 
subjective Interrelationships w ithin the one brain. Such Internal 
interrelationships are obviously highly complex and self-reflexive and 
enable no reliable conclusions to be drawn regarding the relationship of 
cognition and sensation.
On the other hand, evaluated by an external observer, It Is well-known that 
cognition Is often In error in Interpreting sensation. One case of th is type 
of error, i.e., that wherein cognition reports a sensation which does not 
exist In real terms, Is even given a formal classification -  psychosomatic.
There are also cases where It Is apparent to an external observer that 
sensory stimulation 1s occurring without the person concerned being fu lly  
or at all aware of the fact.
The second line of argument against the Incorrig ib ility  thesis Is that 
contained In the statements by Smart and Armstrong quoted above and 
amounting to the statement that cognition and sensation are d istinct 
existences and are therefore logically separable and not such that the link 
between them is Incorrigible.
The third line of argument directed above against Kripke's attempt to 
refute the Identity Theory was that the empirical evidence does not 
support Kripke's assumption that cognition and sensation are one and the 
same state. This is not applicable In the argument against the 
Incorrig ib ility thesis since the Incorrlg lbillsts ' case against the Identity 
thesis Is specifically that the link between the brain's cognitive and 
sensory mechanisms Is Interruptible whereas the link between cognition 
and sensation Is Incorrigible, I.e., not interruptible.
It Is evident from the above considerations that the Incorrig ib ility 
argument against the Identity thesis derives much of Its support from the
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confusions attendant upon subjectivity and self-reference. Without such 
support, there Is l i t t le  to be said In favour of the argument. It can strongly 
be held that the 'mental* link between sensation and cognition Is as 
Interruptible as the link between the brain process Involved In sensation 
and the brain process Involved In cognition and, consequently, that the 
Incorrig ib ility argument against the Identity thesis Is Invalid.
Boyd presents Krlpke's essentlallst thesis on a somewhat different basis 
and w ith a different end in view, that of establishing a case for the 
rejection of Krlpke's conclusion that the essentlallst thesis throws 
considerable doubt upon the theory of materialism. He recapitulates the 
arguments of the traditional Identity theorists as being In accordance 
w ith  a Lockean or empiricist account of rea lity de dlcto, l.e., such that 
"necessarily true statements are jus t those whose truth follows from the 
meanings of their constituent terms."0 0 On this account, If  the truth of a 
statement of Identity 1s not known a priori from the meanings of the 
terms, then the statement of Identity can only be contingently true. In this 
case, different meanings can be ascribed to the sides of the statement and 
the different descriptions do not have to be Intertranslatable.
He next considers what he classifies as a non-Lockean or essential is t 
account of reality and necessity de re, l.e., such "that the essential 
properties of a thing do not depend on a particular description of it."(12)0n 
this account - Krlpke's thesis rephrased -  It does not follow that 
re fu tab ility  Implies the non-existence of necessity In the statement of 
Identity as assumed by the traditional Identity theorists. Necessity and 
apriority are separated and a statement that an object A has an essential 
property B w ill, If true, be true necessarily, even If not known a priori. In 
this case, contingency Is not a valid modal alternative for the statement 
of Identity - the statement of Identity Is either true or false - and the 
contingency that Is apparent must derive from a source other than that of 
the relationship between the sides of the Identity statement.
Boyd refers to the strategy which Krlpke used to bring this point out, i.e., 
comparison of the original statements of identity of the analogies w ith 
corresponding statements of Identity which are clearly contingent. For 
example, he compares the statement of identity, 'Water is identical to 
H20.' which Is necessarily true according to the essentlallst approach,
w ith the corresponding contingent statement of Identity, 'The cooling, 
tasteless, odourless, wetting liquid that quenches th irs t Is Identical to 
H20.' In this case, the statement of Identity Is a contingent statement
since it  Involves the way the liquid Is picked out and this Is an empirical
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report which may or may not lead to H20.
It Is at this point that Boyd disputes Krlpke’s line of thought. He disagrees 
w ith Krlpke's claim that the statement of Identity of a mental and a 
physical state cannot sim ilarly be counterfaced by a contingent statement 
of Identity and consequently, according to Krlpke, that the contingency 
that Is apparent In the original statement of Identity can reside only In the 
relationship between the mental and physical states. According to Krlpke, 
this can only mean that the Identity thesis must be suspect.
However, Boyd holds that the statement of identity of pain and C-flbre 
stimulation, as a standardised case of mental and physical Identity, be 
counterfaced by a contingent statement of Identity, based not upon the 
substitution of "an appropriate purely qualitative description that does not 
designate r1g1d1y,,(13) for the term ‘pain* -  which Krlpke denies Is possible 
-  but upon the substitution of such a description for the term ‘C-flbre 
stimulation*.
As Boyd puts It, "Of course, this can be done. For any physiological or 
anatomical description like the Imaginary ‘C-flbre firings* there is 
certainly a possible world In which something has the qualitative 
properties typically associated w ith the term In the actual world but 
really Is not, In this case, an Instance of ‘C-flbre firings’.04*
Thus, according to Boyd’s line of argument, the Indicators by which 
cognition picks out the occurrence of C-flbre stimulation or ‘firings ’ could 
be produced by some occurrence other than C-flbre stimulation. The 
contingency that Is apparent In the statement of identity of pain and 
C-flbre stimulation could therefore be a function of the mode In which 
cognition picks out the occurrence of C-flbre stimulation, I.e., the 
sensation of pain, and the statement of Identity of pain and C-flbre 
stimulation, If true, would be necessarily true In the same way as the 
statement of Identity of water and H20, If true, Is necessarily true.
On this basis, It would appear that Krlpke’s arguments against the identity 
thesis are further Invalidated since It Is a prime element of his arguments 
that the statement of Identity of a mental and a physical state cannot be 
counterfaced by a statement of Identity In which a term does not 
designate rig idly and consequently that the contingency apparent in the 
statement of Identity can only reside In the relationship between mental 
and physical states.
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As a result of the above, we now have two lines of objection to Krlpke's 
arguments against the Identity thesis. Firstly, there Is the line presented 
earlier In this section In which Krlpke's assumption that sensation and 
cognitive awareness of sensation are one and the same state Is rejected 
and therefore that the contingency apparent In the statement of Identity of 
a mental and a physical state reside In the mode by which cognition 
picks out sensation.
Secondly, Boyd Is noting that a contingent statement of Identity of mental 
and physical states can be formulated In which one of the terms does not 
designate rig id ly and consequently that the contingency In the statement 
of Identity of a mental and a physical state can reside 1n the mode by 
which the mental/physical referent Is picked out; hence that the 
statement of Identity of a mental and a physical state, I f  true, Is 
necessarily true 1n the same way that the analogies, 1f true, are 
necessarily true.
Boyd Is Intent upon refuting Krlpke's anti-identity thesis and 
anti-materialism arguments primarily In order to leave himself free to 
present his own particular version of the materialism thesis. He claims 
that mental states are functional or configurational and not compositional 
states of organisms and the remainder of his paper Is an attempt to 
establish a sound case In support of this thesis.
According to this functionalist form of materialism, the phenomenon of 
pain can be realised by any one of a set of physiological or even 
non-physlologlcal compositional states - In particular, different 
compositional states In the case of a wide variety of animal forms but 
also Including, at least on the basis of being logically possible, partially 
or to ta lly non-physlologlcal compositional states such as that of a 
'mechanical' system.
It Is a one-many situation which, Boyd contends, Is neither type-type or 
token-token compositional Identity but a relationship between a certain 
configuration and a pertinent set of compositional systems which have as 
a function of their particular compositions the configuration 'pain'.
Boyd claims that this Is the explication of the materialism thesis which Is 
most plausible In the light of the available empirical evidence and that It 
makes Krlpke's arguments against the Identity thesis, and thereby against 
materialism, tota lly Irrelevant since the Identity thesis Is not a valid 
theory of the mental/physical relationship In the f irs t  place.
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At the some time, according to Boyd, Kripke's essentialist line of thought 
- that properties of a referent can be essential to i t  and not merely a 
matter of Lockean or empiricist description - remains unaffected by the 
configuration/functionalism explication of the materialism thesis and 
continues as the basis for scientific investigation and determination of 
the properties.
It would seem that Boyd's functionalism theory provides a neat 
reconciliation of all the relevant theories and empirical evidence but 
there appears to be a flaw in the line of argument which, i f  true, makes 
his rejection of the identity thesis invalid. The flaw appears in his very 
attempt to replace the identity thesis by a configurational or 
functionalist thesis wherein mental states "are not definable in physical 
terms" according to Boyd <155 but are particular configurational states 
realised by any one of a number of different compositional structures or 
states.
The flaw is that of Boyd's unwarranted assumption that what he calls 
compositional plasticity, e.g., the range of compositional states which can 
bring about the state of pain, implies a configurational rather than a 
compositional relationship between mental and physical states,
A particular case of the range of compositional states is that of the 
extensive redundancies w ithin the human brain. Boyd refers to this case 
himself; "For example, the most plausible accounts of certain cases of 
recovery from aphasia induced by brain lesions seem to be that the 
relevant information-processing function of the damaged tissue is taken 
over by parts of the nervous system that do not typically perform these 
functions. There is no reason to doubt the logical possibility (indeed the 
practical possibility in many cases) that mental and psychological states 
other than linguistic capacities also display a sim ilar p lastic ity . '*165
There is no apparent reason to ascribe configurational rather than 
compositional significance to such a redundancy. It can be held, at least 
as strongly, to imply nothing more than a range of type-type 
compositional identities, token-token identity occurring at any point 
w ithin the range. Such a redundancy would be a logical evolutionary 
development under highly competitive conditions. An organism with a 
highly lim ited redundancy range of brain properties could quickly become 
extinct under ever changing environmental conditions, both those due to 
climatic changes and those due to the impact of other evolving life-forms.
Nor does Boyd appear to be justified in claiming that only a
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configurational explanation can account for the occurrence of the state of 
pain in such varied brain structures and compositions as occur in the rest 
of the animal world. It is an anthropocentric construal to claim that a 
brain structure and composition greatly different from that of the human 
brain is to be regarded as not being capable of producing the state of pain. 
Introducing the configurational interpretation to explain the difference 
would appear to be an unnecessary and unwarranted complication unless 
distinguishing evidence is put forward to ju s tify  that introduction. Boyd 
does not do this.
Boyd refers to the empirical evidence as though this supports the 
functionalism thesis rather than that of identity but there is nothing in 
the evidence to jus tify  such an interpretation. Perhaps that is why he 
makes the following statement; "The point is that there is no evidence 
that mental and psychological states should not be viewed as 
computational states of organisms."<17)
However, positive evidence is required, not a lack of negative evidence, if  
the functionalism thesis is to be accepted in preference to the identity 
thesis. Possible such evidence is available only in the simulation by 
computers of the brain's mode of processing information but the 
simulation clearly establishes nothing other than something of the 
characteristics of that brain process. It establishes nothing whatsoever 
regarding the other vital state of the brain - that of consciousness.
Kalke presents a slightly different line of objection to the functionalism 
thesis. He relates external functional behaviour to internal 'black box' 
structure, arguing that there is no clear-cut meaningful boundary between 
the functional and structural states and that any boundary is dictated 
more by the current level of empirical knowledge regarding any 
phenomenon than by any precise definitive distinction between the two 
states.
While Kalke's claim might be disputed by the functionalists in the 
particular realm of computer simulation of information processing by the 
brain - the boundary there between the internal mechanism of the brain 
and the delivered output could be held to be well-defined although even 
this is highly questionable - his argument against the functionalism 
thesis is certainly d ifficu lt to dispute in the case of brain phenomena 
such as pain. There is simply no evidence that the occurrence of the 
sensation of pain is in any way independent of and not identical to the 
occurrence of a particular compositional state of the brain. To extend the 
computational case to the point of claiming that the occurrence of the
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sensation of pain is logically possible irrespective of the nature of the 
compositional state is far too great a logic step.
What we are claiming above is that the functionalism thesis neither 
replaces nor adds anything significant to the identity thesis. Neither the 
arguments advanced by functionalists such as Boyd nor the empirical 
evidence provides any significant support for preferring the functionalism 
thesis to that of identity.
Honderich represents a special class today - that of those who fu lly  
accept the truth of determinism but reject the identity theory. He holds 
that the brain has separate mentalistic and physicalistic properties, as 
distinct from being picked out and reported by different mentalistic and 
physicalistic modes as in the identity theory, and that these properties 
stand in different relationships to the environment. Hence, that an 
identity relationship does not exist.
As an analogy, he refers to the case of a yellow pear placed on a scale. The 
property of colour and the property of weight of the pear have different 
effects upon the scale and Honderich claims that mentalistic and 
physicalistic properties of the brain are sim ilarly differentiated in 
relation to the environment.^19)
In place of the identity thesis, he introduces his Union Theory, this being a 
combination of his Correlation Hypothesis, that there is a lawlike 
correlation between "neural and mental events" and his Hypothesis on the 
Causation of Psychoneural Pairs, that "mental events are explained by 
certain causal sequences''.^20)
It would appear that Honderich is in error in his assumption that the 
'mental' and the 'physical' are each properties of the brain, separately 
existing, separately related to the environment and causally related to 
each other, thereby implying the possibility of independent existence. This 
was the simulated dualism of properties within the one deterministically 
functioning system that was mentioned briefly in PART I as being, even if  
i t  existed, merely a particular form of monism, i.e., that wherein the 
mentalistic stream is tied deterministically and therefore inseparably to 
the physicalistic stream, the two streams being in reality a single stream 
functioning in accordance with the one set of laws, and as being, in any 
case, according to the empirical evidence, such that nothing more is 
required for the occurrence of a particular mentalistic state than the 
occurrence of a particular physicalistic state, i.e., the two states are, in 
reality, one and the same state.
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Apart from objections to the identity theory such as those examined 
above, there have been a number of attempts to significantly modify the 
content of the theory without denying its  basic validity. Three such 
attempts are perhaps worthy of passing mention - the ‘disappearance’ 
form of the theory, the theory of eliminative materialism and the theory 
of emergent mentalism with its  sub-theory of downward causation. On 
close examination, all appear to add nothing significant to the basic 
identity theory and to merely confuse or triv ia lise  the issue.
However, to refute or strongly question the arguments against the identity 
theory is not to solve all problems. It is one matter to establish that the 
identity theory is not false a priori and that the most prominent analytic 
objections to the theory are ill-founded or otherwise unconvincing. It is 
quite another to provide positive scientific and other empirical evidence 
in support of the identity theory and to ascertain what are the 
fundamental properties of the mental/physical state. An identity 
relationship between mental and physical states moves the problem from 
being that of the relationship to being that of the reductive constitution 
of the mental/physical state - right down to the most fundamental level 
of constitution of the entity concerned.
However, before dealing with this wider issue in some detail, i t  is f irs t  
necessary to note that a state of stagnation appears to have been reached 
in philosophical deliberations regarding the identity theory and i t  is 
claimed here that this state of stagnation has been reached because a 
fu lly comprehensive approach has not been taken to the problem.
In the case of the present study, i t  is considered that this more 
comprehensive approach should take a particular course at this juncture 
of the study; f irs t, a review of the pertinent empirical evidence and then 
an attempt to formulate a theory that derives convincingly and 
comprehensively from both the analytic arguments and the empirical 
evidence and provides a useful account of some of the most fundamental 
properties of the Universe. These two elements of the overall project are 
developed in PARTS III and IV below.
However, before proceeding w ith this task, i t  has become evident that 
there is a need to clearly establish the meaning of certain, important 
terms before proceeding to the main body of the study and much of 
section 3. is directed to this end.
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3. Meanings and clarifications
3.1 Reductive identity vis-a-vis irreducible supervenience and emergence
The meaning ascribed to the term reductive identity is not lim ited to the 
present study. The term is used widely w ith the same meaning -  that of 
designating the various structural levels of occurrence and properties 
attached to one and the same entity such as the brain or to any other such 
single entity whatsoever. Thus, according to the identity theory, the brain 
has certain holistic properties, i.e., properties beyond those of its  parts 
standing alone but to ta lly  reductive thereto, the holistic properties being 
theoretically explicable in terms of the properties of the parts and 
therefore being theoretically predictable therefrom. Similarly, the 
molecular assemblies of which the parts of the brain are constituted have 
holistic properties beyond those of the molecules of which they are 
constituted but to ta lly  reductive thereto; the individual molecules of 
which the molecular assemblies are constituted have holistic properties 
beyond those of the atoms etc of which they are constituted but to ta lly 
reductive thereto; and so on down to the fundamental level w ith its  own 
particular properties whatever they might be and which underlie the 
properties of the brain at all its  levels.
It is this hierarchical form of reductive identity that is an essential 
element in the meaning of the term identity in the present analysis. It is 
in complete contrast to the concept of irreducible supervenience and 
emergence which ascribe properties to 'higher1 levels of assemblage of the 
'material' of the Universe which are not reducible to, i.e., explicable in 
terms of, properties of lower levels and therefore not predictable 
therefrom. Supervenience is taken here to be an irreducible relationship 
between two entities or systems as a consequence of an entity or system 
functioning in accordance with a 'principle', i.e., set of laws, different 
from that of another entity or system which it  is superimposed upon in 
some way. Emergence sim ilarly involves two entities functioning in 
accordance with different, irreducible 'principles', i.e., sets of laws, but 
in this case one entity or system is some kind of irreducible evolutionary 
development from the other entity or system.
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3.2 Logical necessity vis-a-vis deterministic necessity
Clarification of the distinction between logical and deterministic 
necessity, i.e., s tr ic t individual determinism, is important to the thesis of 
the present study as a means, not only of heightening the distinction 
between the real world and the representation of the real world - the 
world-image, but also clarifying the distinction between the process of 
thought as a logical, and often illogical, sequence of states of the brain 
and the process of thought as a deterministic sequence of states of the 
brain as part of the deterministic functioning of the Universe.
On the one hand, the modal meaning of logical necessity is s tr ic tly  a 
philosophical question and i t  has been dealt w ith at great length on that 
basis without any conclusive explication being reached according to some 
philosophical opinion.
On the other hand, the principle of deterministic necessity is commonly 
expressed in the statement, i f  p then q, where p and q are states of the 
Universe, but this is essentially an epistemological formulation of the 
principle and is subject to analysis of the meaning of ‘if ' and ‘then*. An 
ontological formulation of the principle is that where the Universe is 
represented by a mathematical formula such as that by Russell*1* Time 
being the only variable in such a formula, the state of the Universe is 
determined throughout all eternity.
It has also been suggested, e.g., by Einstein ^  and Davies/3* that the 
concept of necessity is applicable to the Universe with the meaning of 
total or systemic necessity - that the Universe is the only possible 
universe and could not have been or be anything other than what i t  was, is 
or ever w ill be.
To reach the most complete understanding of the distinction between 
logical and deterministic necessity, the requirement is not merely that of 
distinguishing between a statement of logical necessity as a particular 
form of modality in formal logic processing and a statement of 
deterministic necessity as an empirical truth on the grounds of extensive, 
consistent and predictive empirical evidence of the mode of functioning of 
the Universe. It is also that of rejecting the common belief or unconscious 
assumption that the process of thought is somehow independent of the 
process of deterministic necessity as the mode of functioning of the 
Universe.
The present analysis concentrates in itia lly  upon this point since it  is
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most sharply In conflict w ith prevailing religious ond most philosophical 
thought today. This effectively - i f  not consciously - accords w ith the 
assumption that the human brain is, or contains, some kind of 
independent, homuncular entity which is somehow able to function 
independently of the world external to the brain yet is able to interact 
with that world. The work of Spinoza, d'Holbach, Darwin, Freud, Einstein 
etc and, to a lesser extent, Place, Feigl and Smart, has made considerable 
inroads upon this anthropocentric form of dualism but a monistic and 
deterministic theory of consciousness, being and knowable reality has 
only just begun to take its  place.
What we are drawing attention to here is the statement that, i f  true, 
deterministic necessity is true of every functional relationship w ithin a 
monistic universe. Such relationships would include all relationships 
reported or described as 'mental' and consequently the whole course of 
human thinking, including the very occurrence of such concepts as those of 
logical and deterministic necessity and the whole edifice of science and 
technology. It can be held that, without the principle of logical necessity 
as a basis for constructive human or machine thinking - in particular, 
construction of the edifice of science as an image of the real world - the 
principle of deterministic necessity could never have become apparent 
with its  prospective impact upon almost every realm of human 
understanding and affairs; and, without the principle of deterministic 
necessity w ith its  statement of the orderly functioning and evolution of 
the Universe, the principle of logical necessity could also never have 
become apparent.
It is evident that the relationship between logical and deterministic 
necessity warrants considerable analysis and the relationship has been 
examined by a number of thinkers, Planck, ^  Kripke ^  and Qu i neamong 
them, but no one has developed the principle of deterministic necessity to 
its logical conclusion vis-a-vis the identity theory and the whole range of 
human thought as is attempted in the present study.
If the principle of deterministic necessity, i.e. determinism, is not a true 
interpretation of the mode of functioning of the whole of the Universe, 
then the whole structure of science, technology and rational thought 
becomes suspect and possibly nothing other than a grand illusion. The 
empirical evidence is against such a n ih ilis t conclusion even though the 
very truth of the principle of deterministic necessity would itse lf appear 
to imply that nihilism is the only logical interpretation of the empirical 
position according to some, more narrowly conceived points of view.
32
The phenomena of the quantum has led many philosophers to adopt an 
alternative theory - that the mode of functioning of the Universe Is only 
statistic© deterministic, l.e., that there Is an element of ontological 
Indeterminacy In the functioning of the sub-atomic realm and thereby In 
the macro realm that makes perfect predictability and retrodlctablllty 
Impossible.
The line of argument does not appear to be sound. An element of 
ontological Indeterminacy In the sub-atomic realm could only bring about 
an element of randomness and meaninglessness In the functioning of the 
macro realm and In the functioning of the Universe as a whole but science 
has never confirmed the occurrence of any such events. Sooner or later, a 
logical, unprobablllstlc explanation has always been forthcoming and such 
explanations are evidence of a deterministic process. Precise prediction 
and retrodlctlon Is found In practice to be Increasingly the norm In all 
areas of science and technology and the theory of ontological 
Indeterminism Is Increasingly without empirical support. It Is also now 
without the support of such scientists as Einstein, Planck, Schroedlnger, 
Bohm and Hawking and such philosophers as Russell and Honderlch.
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3.3 Consciousness
Since clarification of something of the fundamental meaning of the term 
consciousness is one of the prime objectives of the present analysis, i t  is 
important - in view of the prevailing lack of precise definition of the 
term - to clarify what is at least designated by it.
Probably the most basic statement that can be made about consciousness 
in any terms is that i t  is simply not definable since i t  is an a priori 
absolute and the only means by which i t  can be described, i.e. picked out, 
by human beings are contingent means, fundamentally of much lower rank 
than consciousness itse lf.
However, we can at least consider the various forms in which 
consciousness can be held to occur and the nature of consciousness 
vis-a-vis the nature of mentalistic states in general and this has been 
done by a number of philosophers, Rosenthal^ and P.M.Churchland1^  among 
them.
Although both of those referred to show a considerable lack of conviction 
in many of their statements, one of their more positive statements is that 
by Rosenthal to the effect that "Conscious states are simply mental 
states we are conscious of being in.,,(3) and probably few would disagree 
with the assumption, im p lic it in the statement, that an element of 
introspection or "higher-order" thinking (using Rosenthal's terminology) 
is necessarily involved in the occurrence of consciousness.
However, the empirical evidence does not appear to support such an 
assumption. Rosenthal himself refers to such evidence. "Perhaps the 
strongest objection to an account in terms of higher-order thoughts is 
that there are creatures with conscious sensations whose ability to have 
thoughts at all may be in doubt. Infants and most nonhuman animals 
presumably have a rudimentary ability to think, but plainly do have 
conscious sensations. But one need not have much ability to think to be 
able to have a thought that one is in a particular sensation. Infants and 
nonhuman animals can discriminate among external objects, and master 
regularities pertaining to them. So most of these beings can presumably 
form thoughts about such objects, albeit thoughts that are very likely not 
conscious."(4)
Also Churchland refers to evidence that animals of a lower evolutionary or 
hierarchical order such as rhesus monkeys, macaques, baboons and even 
"some profoundly retarded humans" appear not to be conscious of
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themselves whereas higher order animals such as chimpanzees definitely 
ore.<5)
Also again, as referred to in more detail in section 7.2 below, Gardner's 
medical experience has led him to the conclusion that human beings who 
have lost the use of the frontal lobes of their brains - where conceptual 
power appears to reside according to other medical evidence - show no 
evidence of any sense of self although otherwise not severely handicapped. 
On the other hand, he has noted that brain-damaged patients whose brains 
s t ill retain effective frontal lobes s t i l l  appear to retain a definite sense 
of self even though otherwise extensively handicapped.
It cannot reasonably be held that a monkey, a human being who has lost the 
frontal lobes of his brain and the whole range of non-human, 'lower' forms 
of animal are not conscious of the external world even i f  not of 
themselves and of their own mental states so that Rosenthal's statement 
appears to be definitely flawed.
Hence, on the evidence, i t  would appear that i t  is not consciousness of 
being conscious that is the mark of consciousness as Rosenthal claims but 
cognition defined as merely a state of practical or experiential awareness 
of the external world and of interaction w ith that world.
In other words, i t  would appear that, where an organism has any kind of 
sensory mechanism and any kind of interpretative mechanism - a brain or 
a rudimentary equivalent of such an organ - that interpretative mechanism 
can either be in a basic state of cognition, i.e., cognitive consciousness, 
relative to the external world or - under more developed and evolved 
conceptual conditions as evidenced by the development of frontal lobes in 
the case of the human brain - i t  can be in a state of cognitive 
consciousness which includes introspection - in particular, a sense of self 
and consciousness of being conscious.
On this basis, consciousness always involves cognition and i t  is a 
tautology to add the term cognitive to the term consciousness. 
Nevertheless, this is done at appropriate points throughout the present 
analysis in order to emphasise the cognitive nature of the particular 
relationship being referred to. The juxtaposition is not to be taken as 
implying in any such case that a form of consciousness is held to occur 
which could be described as non-cognitive in terms of cognition as defined 
above. It is d ifficu lt to conceive of any such form of consciousness.
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3.4 Sweeping clean
The context within which the statement of the deterministic identity 
theory is being made is now almost complete. Previous sections of this 
study have re-asserted the truth of the identity thesis, pointed to the 
widespread lack of conviction as to that truth and indicated something of 
the more comprehensive and penetrating deterministic identity theory 
which it  is claimed herein is the most logical interpretation of the 
analytic and empirical evidence.
There would appear to be l i t t le  justifica tion for attempting to further 
validate the analytic arguments put forward by the traditional identity 
theorists in support of the identity theory or to further refute or strongly 
question the objections raised by those attempting to disprove those 
arguments. It would appear that all relevant arguments have already been 
presented from every possible point of view by the philosophers who have 
concerned themselves with the problem.
In any case, the line of justification put forward by the progenitors of the 
Identity Theory was concerned primarily w ith establishing that the theory 
is not false a priori and there was no attempt to directly prove that the 
identity theory is a true statement of the relationship between the 
'mental' and the ‘physical’. Such a proof would be an empirical statement - 
a scientific image of the real world - and, as an empirical statement, i t  
requires empirical verification. This is attempted in PART III of the study.
However, the analysis to date at least indicates that there is considerable 
justification for making the following two statements;
1. The identity theory is a true statement of the relationship between a 
'mental' and a 'physical' state.
2. The identity theory is only an element of a more comprehensive theory 
of consciousness, being and knowable reality.
The remainder of the present study is directed to further developing and 
establishing the validity of these two statements and deriving from them 
details of that more comprehensive theory.
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PART III THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4  Introduction
It Is not w ith in  the scope of the present study to examine all the current 
arguments for or against the truth of the principle of determinism except 
for one very Important aspect which 1s dealt w ith In section 5.1 below -  
rejection of the claim that the form of Indeterminacy observed In the 
sub-atomic realm provides convincing evidence that the principle of 
determinism Is false.
All the scientific  arguments of any note have otherwise been examined by 
Davies in his most informative book, "God and the new Physics", (1) by 
Earman In his equally Impressive book, "A Primer on Determ1nism"(2) and, 
most recently and authoritatively, by Hawking In his 'A Brief History of 
T1me‘.(3) Honderlch has also, in considerable detail In his 'A Theory of 
Determinism',(4) recently considered the empirical evidence put forward, 
for and against, the principle of determinism and concluded that the 
principle Is true throughout all realms of existence of the Universe. The 
statements made below regarding the scientific and other empirical 
evidence that points to the truth of the theory of deterministic monism 
and to Its extension, the deterministic Identity theory, provides only an 
outline of the particularly relevant scientific evidence and the books 
referred to must be consulted for a fu ll treatment.
All that Is required for the present study Is an explanatory listing of the 
empirical Items which Individually and collectively provide a vast amount 
of consistent evidence pointing to the truth of the deterministic Identity 
theory, far outweighing in Importance any peripheralistlc intuition or 
experience or any fringe phenomenon which could be held to indicate that 
the theory is not entirely true. It Is the great bulk of consistent empirical 
evidence that counts, not the peripheralIstic intuitions, hopes and 
traditional Indoctrinations or the li t t le  understood phenomena at the 
outermost fringes of scientific knowledge.
The ascription of truncated causality to the relationship between events 
has also been a source of very considerable misunderstanding. To ascribe a 
particular cause to an event Is typically to unjustifiably truncate a much 
longer causal chain, thereby closing the door to a fu ll understanding and 
frequently to open the door to gross misinterpretation. Meyer is typical of 
those who are guilty of this particular form of non-sequltur when he 
argues that "God exists." solely as a consequence of his argument that 
there has to be a f irs t  cause and that a f irs t  cause can only be God.(5) He
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thereby joins the class of rationalist philosophers who have very largely 
ignored the empirical evidence in favour of highly directed speculation 
built upon theoretical premises which bear l i t t le  relation to empirical 
reality.
Meyer's proof of the existence of God is no more convincing than that of 
Aquinas or of the many others who have attempted to prove the existence 
of God on purely rationalist grounds such as that of the cosmological 
argument for the existence of God. There is no demonstrable empirical 
evidence to support their claim that there was a f irs t cause of the 
Universe and that a god was responsible for that f irs t  cause any more than 
there is any demonstrable empirical evidence to support the claim that 
there w ill be a last effect, i.e., total annihilation of the Universe, and that 
a god w ill be responsible for that last effect.
The demonstrable empirical evidence is solely to the effect that the 
Universe exists and, since i t  exists, the evidence can only be held to imply 
that i t  w ill continue to exist indefinitely into the future in one form or 
another and has existed, in one form or another, indefinitely in the past, 
the Big Bang, the primary plasma state, some kind of 'singularity' or 
whatever else is taken to be the primary state of the Universe being 
merely some kind of transition point between particular states of reality.
The philosophical principle which transcends all other philosophical 
principles relating to the structure and functioning of the Universe is that 
which states, in accordance with the most a priori of premises and 
paradigms - and also with all the known empirical evidence - that 
something cannot come from total nothing and something cannot become 
total nothing. What is, always was and always w ill be in one form or 
another.
Certainly, i t  is logically possible that there could have been a f irs t cause 
of the occurrence and/or deterministic functioning of the Universe, e.g., as 
an extension of a deist god at the time of whatever is taken to be the 
primary state of the Universe or a particular state at some particular- 
point of its  evolutionary history, but it  is not logically provable that there 
could have been a firs t cause of everything which ever existed, including 
the existence of the deist god. Such an event would have required that 
something originated in total nothing or that creation occurred after the 
coming into existence of what had been created - both propositions being 
outside the realm of sustainable logic.
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It follows, at least In terms of sustainable logic, that the Universe has 
always existed and always w ill exist in one form or another.
39
5. Physics: the structure and functioning of the Universe 
5.1. General
It was said by Nietzsche that there is no way In which we can establish 
whether or not the course of evolution of the entity which we call the 
Universe accords w ith  the principle of determinism. Expressing the 
principle in the form, If p then q, his statement is equivalent to the 
statement that we cannot know whether or not there is a randomness in 
the course of events such that q is not a specific state following upon the 
occurrence of p but can encompass a lim ited or an in fin ite  range of states.
The statement appears to be flawed since It is evident that the whole of 
science and technology depends upon the truth of the principle of
determinism - or at least statistico determinism, as some would have us 
believe is the form of the course of events. Science and technology could 
not exist If  events did not occur at least statistico deterministically and 
thereby predictably w ith in at least an extremely high order of accuracy. 
As Russell says, "Determinism, whether universally true or not, is
coextensive w ith the sphere of possible scientific knowledge; where it  
fa ils, scientific knowledge fa ils.,,(1) and this is a valid statement even 
allowing for the possibility of a lim ited measure of some kind of
ontological indeterminacy in the functioning of the sub-atomic realm. Any 
such indeterminacy would introduce an element of randomness and 
meaninglessness into the functioning of the macro realm and, to that 
extent, lim it the predictability and retrodictability required for the
practice of science and technology. No such lim itation to the practice of 
science and technology has ever been established.
In other words, whatever the particular mode of functioning of the 
sub-atomic realm might be and whatever ‘hidden variables’ are yet to be 
discovered that might account for that mode in more fundamental terms, 
the total of the evidence as it  stands today is in favour of the sub-atomic 
functioning being taken to be merely a particular form of deterministic 
interrelationship w ith the other realms of existence of the entity or 
system that is the Universe. If i t  did not involve any such 
interrelationship, i.e., if  i t  occurred and functioned without being subject 
to any force from elsewhere in the Universe, i t  would be a form of 
self-creationism w ith all the philosophical and empirical d ifficu lties  
attached to such a concept.
The claim that q, although not related to p fu lly  in deterministic terms, is 
nevertheless constrained within a lim ited range of possibilities dictated
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by p is a claim which s t il l has an element of self-creationism in i t  and to 
that extent is sim ilarly highly questionable.
It is also highly relevant to note that the phenomena of the sub-atomic 
realm are currently evaluated by applying macro concepts such as 
momentum, position and velocity which is clearly naive in view of the 
known, but as yet almost entirely inexplicable, complexities of the micro 
realm such as the wave/particle duality instead of what were previously 
thought to be merely simple particles and the universal commonality of 
some kind that is implied by the quantum phenomena according to some 
scientists. All such phenomena are clearly beyond the reach of current 
macro concepts and need to be fu lly  understood before anyone can 
justifiab ly claim that the occurrence of some kind of ontological 
indeterminacy is proven. Any claim that a recent experiment in physics 
has provided a complete and final answer to the question of the mode of 
functioning of the micro realm is, to say the least, highly presumptive at 
the present embryonic stage of investigation and knowledge regarding the 
properties of that realm.
As regards the particular properties of the sub-atomic realm, 
Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy regarding the properties of a 
sub-atomic 'particle' has suggested to some that q can involve a lim ited 
range of micro states and thereby a lim ited range of macro states, thereby 
proving the principle of s tr ic t individual determinism false, but others 
have contended that the Principle of Indeterminacy is a statement merely 
of epistemological indeterminacy and therefore does not imply any lack of 
ontological determinacy of q, i.e., any departure from the principle of 
s tric t determinism. The question is by no means settled in favour of 
ontological indeterminacy - whatever such indeterminacy could possibly 
mean. Quite the opposite, according to the most recent and authoritative 
trend in science and philosophy as referred to below in this section.
Other phenomena in the realm of physics are considered by some to 
provide evidence of some kind of ontological indeterminacy in the 
functioning of the sub-atomic realm. One of these is that of radioactive 
breakdown, the claim being that, because we cannot predict when a 
particular particle w ill break down, this must imply an element of 
ontological indeterminacy.
The argument is not valid any more than i t  is valid to assert that, because 
we cannot predict when a particular molecule of gas w ill pass through a 
hole in a container, this implies ontological indeterminacy. In such cases, 
the inability to predict is due to the complexity of the problem and, in the
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case of the radioactive breakdown, also due to our lack of complete 
understanding of the forces operating. Probability rather than individual 
causal analysis is required in such cases as the only practical means of 
taking account of the phenomenon mathematically but this is not to imply 
that some kind of ontological rather than epistemological indeterminacy 
is involved. As Russell points out, the fact that there is a statistica l 
predictability in such cases is very strong evidence that the events are 
occurring in accordance with deterministic laws of functioning.^ 
Schroedinger describes the situation as being statistico-determ inistic 
and denies that any form of ontological indeterminacy is involved.^
Certain other phenomena at the outermost fringes of scientific knowledge 
are also held by many to indicate that some form of ontological 
indeterminacy exists in the functioning of the sub-atomic realm. These 
are amply described by Davies ^  and Earman(s) and there is no need to 
detail the evidence again here since the thesis of the present study 
requires only a high probability that the functioning of the Universe is 
s tr ic tly  deterministic. Such a probability is well supported by the wide 
range of consistent empirical evidence referred to in the present study 
whereas the evidence recapitulated by Davies and Earman is far more 
indicative of the need for further scientific research than i t  is of any 
certainty that some kind of ontological indeterminacy occurs in the 
functioning of the sub-atomic realm.
Honderich's 'A Theory of Determinism', previously referred to, is a recent, 
very comprehensive and penetrating examination of the pertinent micro 
and macro evidence regarding the truth or otherwise of determinism and 
he also joins the class of those who very strongly claim that s tric t 
determinism is a true statement of the functioning of the Universe.
Hawking, regarded as the most authoritative mathematician and 
cosmologist of the present day, expresses the present position powerfully. 
"We now know that Laplace's hope of determinism cannot be realized, at 
least in the terms he had in mind. The uncertainty principle of quantum 
mechanics implies that certain pairs of quantities, such as the position 
and velocity of a particle, cannot both be predicted with complete 
accuracy.
Quantum mechanics deals with this situation via a class of quantum 
theories in which particles don't have well-defined positions and 
velocities but are represented by a wave. These quantum theories are 
deterministic in the sense that they give laws for the evolution of the 
wave with time. Thus, i f  one knows the wave at one time, one can 
calculate i t  at any other time. The unpredictable randum element comes in
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only when we try to interpret the wave in terms of the positions and 
velocities of particles. But maybe that is our mistake; maybe there are no 
particle positions and velocities, but only waves, it  is just that we try to 
f i t  the waves to our preconceived ideas of positions and velocities. The 
resulting mismatch is the cause of the apparent unpredictability."^
As a result of his stance, Hawking joins Einstein, Planck, Schroedinger, 
Honderich and others in the uniquely authoritative class of those eminent 
personages who do not agree with the claim that any form of ontological 
indeterminacy occurs in the functioning of the sub-atomic realm.
The class is therefore providing very considerable support for the theory 
of deterministic monism and its  extension, the deterministic identity 
theory, as outlined in the present study.
One highly significant property of the fundamental constitution of the 
Universe which has come to light in the scientific study of the sub-atomic 
realm must be noted here since i t  bears strongly upon the monism and 
commonality thesis propounded in the present study. It can also be held to 
imply that events in the sub-atomic realm must be evaluated on a much 
more universal basis than that of the localised experiments which have 
led to the claim that there is an element of ontological indeterminacy in 
the functioning of the sub-atomic realm. Those very experiments have 
brought to light evidence of a remarkable commonality in the 
relationships involved - a commonality which appears to involve the 
whole of the Universe in some way and which has never previously 
appeared in scientific experiments. The phenomenon needs to be fu lly 
explained before it  would be logical to claim that the occurrence of some 
form of ontological indeterminacy in the functioning of the sub-atomic 
realm has been confirmed.
Three prominent scientists - Einstein, Planck and Bohr - were f irs t  
instrumental in pointing the way in the 20th century to the theory that the 
Universe is a single, monistic entity or system, i.e., one structured and 
functioning in accordance with a single 'principle' or set of laws, the 
single set of functioning laws, interrelationships and interactions being 
lim ited only by the lim its of the Universe whatever these might be. The 
theory is based upon four consistent elements; the transmutability of all 
forms of 'matter' and energy; the well-established quantum theory with 
its  momentous implications as to the universal commonality of the 
fundamental constitution of the Universe - the so-called universal, 
seamless fabric of the Universe; the equally well-established theory of 
re la tiv ity , special and general, w ith its  statement that the Universe is a
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single entity w ith certain universal properties and specific overall 
dimensions; and the unified field theory which is strongly held in science 
to be reachable as a further representation of the overall monistic unity 
of the Universe.
The theory that the Universe is characterised by some kind of universal 
commonality is of course not new. It has been put forward previously in 
various forms, notably in Spinoza's pantheism claiming that God is 
everything and in the various forms of hylozoism and panpsychism which 
have been put forward within natural philosophy down the ages.
Scientists who have been particularly instrumental in drawing attention 
to the implication from the quantum theory that the Universe is a single, 
monistic entity structured with some kind of universal commonality or 
'substance' at the fundamental level have been Schroedinger,(7) 
Heisenberg^ and Bohm.(9) Davies can once again be referred to for a 
comprehensive treatment of the experiments and arguments. One of his 
telling comments is as follows; "It w ill be evident that there is a strong 
flavour to the quantum aspects of the nature of matter: interlocking levels 
of description w ith everything somehow made up of everything else and 
yet s t ill displaying a hierarchy of structure. It is within this 
all-embracing wholeness that physicists pursue the quest for the ultimate 
constitution of matter and the ultimate, unified force."
There is further strong evidence for the fundamental unity and 
commonality of the Universe and against the possibility that a form of 
interactionary dualism exists that involves two or more systems 
functioning partly or wholly in accordance with different sets of laws. 
Without exception, the empirical evidence indicates that everything we 
know about the Universe is to the effect that energy is always conserved. 
On this basis, interaction between 'our' system and any other system 
would involve either loss or gain of energy. There is no empirical evidence 
that any such loss or gain ever occurs.
WHat we are drawing attention to here is that the principle of 
conservation of energy supplements tha principles of monism and 
determinism, all three principles pointing in conjunction to the claim that 
everything knowable is part of the one deterministically functioning, 
tota lly self-contained and totally unified system which we designate as 
the Universe.
The significant point is that Planck's world-image, a system of logical 
thought f irs t  based upon such early statements as those of Euclid's
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geometry and Newton’s laws of motion, has grown Into a system which 
already encompasses a body of knowledge ranging from the size of the 
Universe and the composition of stars and other celestial bodies to the 
structural, functional and holistic properties of the DNA molecule and 
certain remarkable commonality properties of the sub-atomic world. Yet 
nowhere have phenomena been found which refute the laws upon which the 
world-image has been constructed and successfully used to predict events 
which could not have been predicted other than by the processes of logical 
necessity in human thought precisely matching the processes of 
deterministic necessity in the real world. It is this predictability which 
has given such an aura of certainty to the world-image and has thrown 
such doubt upon the claim, based upon the quantum theory, that the 
functioning of the Universe is merely probabilistic.
We may not as yet be able to predict the future state of a complex macro 
system such as that of the weather or that of a complex molecular system 
which is subject to breakdown as recorded by a Geiger Counter but the 
realm of precise predictability without any evidence of ontological 
indeterminacy is nevertheless constantly being expanded and no evidence 
has appeared to prove that there is any lim it to the realm.
On the basis of all the above considerations, i t  would strongly appear once 
again that logical and deterministic necessity are the two sides of a 
single coin - a statement which is developed further in the next section.
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5.2 First state, forces, laws and necessity
A combination of astrophysics and mathematics has enabled us to 
establish what appears to be a very consistent and comprehensive picture, 
l.e., world-image, of the process of evolution of the Universe since one 
particular point in Its  evolutionary history -  the moment Immediately 
before the Big Bang, the primary plasma state, some kind of 'singularity' or 
whatever else is taken to be the primary state of the Universe. At that 
particular moment, which can be conveniently called the moment of 
nominal f ir s t  state in that there must have been a previous state of some 
kind unless something can come from total nothing, forces evidently came 
into being which have since operated in accordance w ith a specific set of 
laws. Knowledge of those laws has enabled highly detailed and precise 
mathematical predictions to be made which have accorded w ith  the 
occurrences of the real world.
It is here that there is almost the strongest possible evidence of 
co-occurrence of logical and deterministic necessity. On the one hand, the 
mathematical system which enables predictive exactitude to be achieved 
is formulated on the basis of logical necessity and, on the other, the 
Universe must be functioning on the basis of deterministic necessity 
otherwise the mathematical system would not be applicable and 
predictively precise as i t  has increasingly been found to be, both at the 
micro and the macro levels of investigation and prediction.
The authenticity of physics as a precise representation of the structure 
and functioning of the Universe, l.e., as a precise 'world-image', is 
therefore based upon three assumptions - that the Universe functions 
deterministically, that a theoretical structure constructed according to 
the laws of logical necessity is the appropriate basis for constructing a 
precise representation and that the empirical data available is adequate 
for the construction of that precise representation. The authenticity can 
fa il i f  any one of these three conditions is not met.
However, when they are all met, they confirm each other and this is what 
the evidence increasingly indicates is the case in practice. Logical 
necessity is the mortar which holds the bricks of a meaningful theoretical 
structure together but that structure can only be a precise representation 
of the real world and enable precise predictions to be made regarding the 
functioning of that real world if  the relationships within the real world 
accord w ith the provisions of deterministic necessity and the empirical 
evidence is adequate.
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Logical and deterministic necessity are therefore both Involved in the 
formulation of a precise representation of the structure and functioning of 
the Universe. To the extent that logical necessity is not the basis of that 
formulation, then the representation could not be precise and meaningful 
and, to the extent that deterministic necessity is not the principle 
underlying the structure and functioning of the Universe, then the 
processes of logical necessity could not enable a precise representation to 
be formulated. Nor could those processes enable precise predictions to be 
made. The processes of logical necessity cannot predict any event that is 
not deterministically related to past events and events which are not 
interrelated deterministically cannot be represented by the processes of 
logical necessity.
We see again that, in the case of a Universe that is functioning 
deterministically, logical and deterministic necessity are to each other 
what the world-image and the real world are to each other. The va lid ity of 
the world-image as a precise representation of the real world depends 
upon the processes of logical necessity and the valid ity of the processes 
of logical necessity as a basis for the construction of a precise 
world-image depends upon deterministic necessity being the mode of 
functioning of the real world. In the realm of physics and natural 
philosophy, deterministic necessity necessitates logical necessity and 
logical necessity confirms deterministic necessity.
The claim that an element of ontological indeterminacy occurs in the 
functioning of the sub-atomic realm and that, as a result, the functioning 
of the macro realm is only sta tistlco deterministic -  and consequently 
that a perfect representation or world-image of the real world cannot be 
reached by the processes of logical necessity - is fraught w ith d ifficu lty  
on several grounds, primarily that of lack of philosophical support for the 
concept of an event that is uncaused and that of lack of convincing 
empirical evidence supporting such a claim. The claim is fast losing any 
credibility and is increasingly being rejected by authoritative opinion as 
noted in Section 5.1 above.
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5.3 Naive realism and determinism
Without doubt, the most obvious evidence of the truth of the principle of 
determinism is that to be observed in the day-by-day phenomena of naive 
realism. Every human being predicts a myriad times each day - predicting 
that his world w ill remain essentially the same for the next few seconds, 
minutes or hours etc - which it  always is unless some factor intervenes 
that is outside his realm of knowledge or unless his own involvement is a 
factor in determining the future of his world. The greater the knowledge 
in practice, the more comprehensive and precise the prediction.
Such a situation can only be the case i f  the course of events follows a 
fu lly  predictable path, i.e., a path which accords fu lly w ith logical and 
deterministic necessity. Every human being, every day, by acting on the 
assumption that his or her world w ill take a certain form at the next 
second, minute or hour etc is providing evidence both that the course of 
events is deterministic and that he or she believes, at least 
unconsciously, that this is the case.
More than anything else perhaps, i t  is the predictability that is 
unconsciously assumed in the realm of naive realism which provides the 
most compelling evidence of the truth of the principle of determinism. Yet 
i t  is in that very realm that there is least conscious acceptance of the 
significance of that evidence.
The most probable explanation of this paradoxical situation would appear 
to be that the intense reality and subjectivity of day-by-day living 
conditions human beings to be unaware of or to reject determinism as the 
account of the functioning of the human world even though that account is 
so widely and consistently supported by the rest of the empirical 
evidence.
It. could, of course, be held that the predictability which is unconsciously 
assumed for the functioning of the human world does not extend to the 
process of thought and the behaviour of human beings - that the process 
of thought and the behaviour occur on some basis other than that of s tr ic t 
deterministic necessity.
Such a claim is not supported by the empirical evidence already referred 
to in this study. Also, any lack of logical explanation for the occurrence of 
any event within the realm of naive realism is always quickly noted as 
being a departure from the orderly and predictable course of events, 
indicating once again that human beings are highly conditioned to assume
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that the course of events is deterministic.
in contradistinction to the above, there is the contention, by those 
propounding the hypothesis of ontological indeterminacy at the 
sub-atomic level, that the effect of such indeterminacy at the macro level 
of functioning of the Universe can be accounted for in probabilistic terms 
or is indiscernable at the macro level.
While i t  is theoretically possible that any such sub-atomic indeterminacy 
could have remained undetected to date at the macro level for one or other 
of the reasons given, the inescapable empirical fact is that the empirical 
evidence does not support the contention. The contention is not only purely 
speculative but is against all the available empirical evidence at the 
macro level.
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the precise deterministic 
predictability at the macro level is that of the deep space probes which 
are communicated with and controlled many billions of kilometres away, 
years after launch. There is no evidence of any indeterminacy and only 
probabilistic functioning.
We find therefore that there is nothing significant in the world of naive 
realism which is such as to bring about a loss of confidence in the 
underlying assumption that the course of events is logically 
predictable,i.e., deterministic. The predictability is a prime assumption in 
the human outlook and, to that extent, indicates that there is a universally 
held, underlying - even though unconscious - assumption that the principle 
of s tric t individual determinism is true.
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6.Evo1ution: the process of change and the changes
One derivation above all Is evident from an analysis of the empirical 
evidence regarding the evolutionary process that has occurred on the 
surface of the Earth, both that observable In the evolutionary changes 
occurring everywhere in the world today and that observable in the 
geological, palaeontological, archaeological and anthropological records. 
This is the deterministic continuity of the process, the empirical evidence 
indicating that the state of the evolutionary system at any point of time is 
a deterministic outcome of the state at the preceding point of time. 
Totally inexplicable and inherently unpredictable discontinuities involving 
the advent or emergence of life -form s to ta lly  unrelated to previous 
life-form s are not to be found.
In short, according to the empirical evidence, the source of any particular 
form of life  is always at least potentially to be found in some previous 
form of life  or of inanimate matter, the evolution from one form to the 
other being brought about by natural selection or mutation and/or 
particular environmental conditions. If those previous life-form s or that 
particular form of inanimate matter had not occurred, it  is apparent that 
neither would the ensuing life-forms.
The great diversity of species typically to be observed in the case of any 
genus, is particular evidence of the deterministic nature of the 
evolutionary process. Two cases exemplify the relationships perfectly. The 
f irs t  is also of great historical importance, being the diversity of species 
noted by Darwin on the Galapagos islands. Slightly different environmental 
conditions on the different islands of the group - including the 
environmental effect of interrelationships between the local life -form s -  
has produced slightly different characteristics for the various forms of 
life  on the islands and the empirical evidence is very much to the effect 
that logical explanations can be found to account for the different 
characteristics relative to the particular environmental conditions.
The significance here is that the deterministic continuity of the 
evolutionary process is evidenced by the relationships. Change the 
environment in a particular way and the characteristics of the associated 
life-form s change in a particular way, thereby producing a diversity of 
sub-species or species. There is no evidence of inexplicable 
discontinuities. Each change is actually or potentially understandable and 
predictable from the nature of the environment which can only mean that 
it  occurs once again on the basis of logical and deterministic necessity.
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The other case of sim ilar significance Is that of the great diversity of 
structures of antelope horns noted by Simpson(1) as having evolved due to 
different local environments. None of the structures could be held to be 
perfect for the particular purpose involved and sometimes the structures 
are so specialised as to indicate the extinction of that particular species 
should the environment change only very slightly.
Simpson's use of the term random in analysing such a case has the 
significance of phylogenetic randomness -  a m ultip lic ity  of phylogenetic 
variations w ith  only one variation meeting the requirements of a 
particular environment and thereby resulting in the survival of that 
particular variation. The point he is stressing is that the course of 
evolution is not following any idealised, teleological path. None of the 
antelope horns is ideal for its  purpose and such as to indicate that i t  is 
some kind of evolutionary path into the future that is favoured and 
selected by some kind of supernatural power on a non-deterministic basis.
There are, of course, a vast number of other such cases where the 
diversity of species can be explained in no other way than as the 
inherently predictable outcome of a combination of deterministic 
continuity, phylogenetic variations and particular environmental 
conditions. These phylogenetic variations are now known to include 
mutations as part of the evolutionary process and this has provided a 
firs t-leve l explanation of major changes that have occurred in the 
pataeontological past. Such changes are those from gill-breathing fish to 
lung-breathing reptiles and from cold-blooded, egg-laying reptiles to 
warm-blooded young-bearing mammals and thereby ultimately to the f irs t  
of our hominid ancestors four or more m illion years ago.
Always the trend in scientific knowledge regarding the evolutionary 
process has been towards ever-increasing awareness that every state of 
the evolutionary process is sourced solely and deterministically in the 
preceding state. Every life-form  bears a significant resemblance to some 
previous life -form  in some important element, be i t  cellular construction, 
mode of food absorption, mode of reproduction, internal body structure or 
some other element and the empirical evidence, in toto, indicates very 
strongly that there is a single evolutionary tree of life  on the Earth. 
Knowledge regarding this tree may not be anywhere near complete in every 
detail but enough is already known to enable all life -form s to be placed in 
positions on the tree which are at least reasonably close to being correct 
in terms of logical interrelationships, thereby providing evidence that the 
evolutionary process is deterministic and predictable. Additional 
empirical evidence and scientific insight continues to accumulate and the
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life -form s are typically positioned ever more precisely and logically than 
they were previously.
The most notable and significant case of such deterministic, evolutionary 
relationships is that of man himself. Man today has no property which is 
not found in some degree in some other animal or is not a logical 
evolutionary development from the properties of an earlier form of 
mankind.
Supplementing the above outline of the later, more macro stages of the 
evolution of life  on the Earth is the work this century uncovering an 
understanding of the process of evolutionary development of the most 
elementary forms of life  from inanimate forms of 'substance'. It is from 
the scientific discoveries in this field that the deterministic, and 
therefore logically predictable, relationships between physics, chemistry, 
molecular and organism biology and psychology are now becoming 
apparent. Once again, the empirical evidence increasingly indicates that 
there is deterministic continuity from the most elementary forms of 
substance through ever more complex forms, notably those of the carbon 
compounds, to the incidence, under particular environmental conditions, of 
what appears to be the basic 'building block’ of life-form s, the DNA 
molecule. Lectures 2 and 3 of Crick’s "Of Molecules and Men' can be 
referred to for a comprehensive o u tlin ed
Although much s t ill needs to be discovered before a complete account is 
forthcoming, enough is already known to leave li t t le  doubt that animate 
substance is sourced solely in inanimate substance, thereby once again 
providing evidence which points to the deterministic continuity of all 
processes of the Universe and thereby also to the uniqueness of the 
nominal f irs t state. On the basis of such evidence, i t  can strongly be held 
that all states of the Universe, including all states of human life , are 
deterministically evolved states and nothing but deterministically 
evolved states of that nominal f irs t state.
The hypothesis that there is an element of ontological indeterminacy in 
the functioning of the sub-atomic realm and thereby only statistico 
determinacy in the functioning of the macro world is not in any way or 
degree evidenced in the field of evolution. Any such hypothesis is once 
again purely speculative.
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7. Psychology, the outcome of the evolutionary process 
7.1 General
A telling comment w ith which to open this particular section of the 
empirical evidence pointing to the truth of the principle of determinism 
and the deterministic Identity theory Is that by Hospers, "Only the 
psychiatrist knows what puppets people are.‘,(1) There could scarcely be a 
stronger recognition of the empirical evidence that the functioning of our 
brains Is deterministic and that the functioning - because It Is 
deterministic -  Is amenable to precise description and prediction.
In other words, the realm of psychology Is not In any way or degree 
excluded from the claim that the course of macro events is s tr ic tly  and 
not just sta tls tico deterministic. A human being typically believes that 
his or her own thinking is a matter of 'personal' decision not 
determ inistically sourced in the past - the homuncular 'l i t t le  man 1n the 
brain' syndrome - but the fallacy of the belief Is evidenced by the 
Increasing accuracy w ith which another human being - notably an 
experienced psychiatrist -  thoroughly fam iliar w ith the background and 
psychological characteristics of the f irs t  - can predict or retrodict his or 
her behaviour. Such accuracy of prediction could only occur as a result of 
precognition or as a result of human behaviour being a deterministic 
function of phylogenetic and environmental inputs. The demonstrable 
evidence Is of course all to the effect that precognition is not the process 
involved.
The extent of the empirical evidence indicating that this is a true 
statement is extensive but, once again, only a short outline is appropriate 
for the present philosophical study. Honderlch's 'A Theory of Determinism' 
can be referred to for a detailed analysis of the empirical evidence 
supporting the claim that the functioning of the psychophysical realm is 
entirely deterministic. He reaches the following conclusion. "What is 
evidentially most relevant to the determinist theory of mind that has been 
propounded, to repeat, is neuroscience, a great and growing body of 
knowledge, theory and informed speculation. The conclusion drawn from it  
was that i t  at least very strongly supports the determinist theory. To the 
idea that fundamentals of present-day neuroscience must be as likely to 
suffer fa ls ification as Quantum Theory in the course of history, there is 
the reply among others that neuroscience stands a great deal closer to 
data, to the facts, than does Quantum Theory. It is, because it  is less 
speculative and greatly less far from the sensory evidence, less 
vulnerable."(2)
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The most pertinent elements of the neuroscientific evidence can be 
conveniently examined under the following two headings, both involving 
particular relationships between the attributes of the psyche and the 
structure and functioning of the brain.
1. Phylogenesis
2. Condition and conditioning
There can be li t t le  said against the statement that the innate properties 
of the brain are derived deterministically and thereby predictably and 
retrodlctably from phylogenetic sources if  we had enough knowledge. It is 
well known that the chromosomes which determine all the properties of 
the brain w ith  which a human being is born are determined by the genetic 
properties of the parents and so on indefinitely back to past generations, 
each genetic step in the process being entirely determined by the 
preceding step except to the extent that the chromosomal structure is 
modified by an extraneous force such as a damaging drug, radioactivity or 
other form of interference w ith the ovum, semen or fertilised ovum. 
However, there is no empirical evidence that the interference is not itse lf 
part of the overall deterministic process and consequently there is nothing 
in the phylogenetic process which indicates that the process is not 
deterministic.
The most striking evidence of both determinacy and identity in the 
relationship between past and present psychological states is surely that 
of the effects of age, brain damage, brain surgery, drugs or indoctrination 
upon the properties of the brain and thereby upon the mentalistic 
reportings of those properties which we know as the human psyche. A very 
considerable literature has been directed to detailing these effects and 
there can be li t t le  doubt that the properties of the brain at any specific 
time are a deterministic function of its  history subsequent to the moment 
of conception. Never does there appear to be a time when the properties 
and thereby the psyche are not deterministically dependent upon the 
condition of the brain.
The redundancy which enables the brain to continue to function 
holistically without apparent change in the event of partial destruction, 
is not evidence against the valid ity of this statement. Holistic functioning 
of this type, i.e., as a single functional entity w ith properties beyond those 
of the individual parts merely assembled together, is a universal property 
of all life  forms - sometimes w ith in the peripheralistic confines of a 
constraining but at the same time fac ilita ting  ’skin' as in the case of more 
highly evolved organisms and sometimes without such peripheralistic
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Integration as in the case of an ant or bee colony. No individual cell of the 
human body or bee or ant ever oversees or controls the functioning of the 
whole complex and the complex continues to function without any apparent 
change in Its holistic properties Irrespective of the loss of a considerable 
number of the cells, ants or bees.
The value of redundancy of this type is great in terms of survival under 
highly competitive conditions of natural selection. Without it, the 
organism or colony would have quickly become extinct and this is more 
than enough justifica tion for its  occurrence in the functioning of the 
world of living organisms. There is consequently no case for presenting it  
as being significant evidence against the truth of the principle of 
determinism in the realm of psychology.
The empirical evidence in the realm of psychology has very largely to date 
been the result of work which concentrated upon understanding the 
sources of the properties of the brain which are reported or described as 
the attributes of the psyche. Freud was of course the great in itia to r of 
this approach and there could scarcely have been any other in itia l 
approach.
However, the underlying purpose of psychological analysis has increasingly 
been directed to changing the brain's properties and thereby the psyche and 
the mode of behaviour and to that extent i t  has been predictive and 
indicative of deterministic continuity in the realm of psychology. It now 
includes not merely the techniques of psychiatry, psychotherapy and 
indoctrination but, in small measure as yet, techniques of identifying and 
correcting, early in life , psychological abnormalities which dispose human 
beings to extreme forms of violence and anti-social behaviour. All such 
techniques are predictive and therefore indicative of deterministic 
continuity and relationships.
In practice, it  is found that the sources of the attributes of the psyche and 
the mode of behaviour are always there to be discerned, analysed and 
understood, leading both to predictive accuracy and to conditioning - to 
the lim its  reachable by psychology, brain surgery and drugs. None of this 
would be possible if  psychological attributes and the mode of behaviour 
were not deterministically related to the past and the future.
The process of conditioning the properties of the brain by indoctrination - 
and thereby beliefs and attitudes - is of special significance from more 
than one point of view. Everyone knows what is implied by the statement, 
"Give me a child until the age of seven and I'll have him for the rest of his
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life." and the effectiveness of religious and political Indoctrination in 
general when carried out by expert manipulators - notably in many cases 
parents - has been the source of many of humanity's greatest social 
disasters.
The techniques of psychiatry and psychotherapy may be less threatening to 
the world's progress and stab ility  than religious and political 
Indoctrination but they are no less indicative of deterministic continuity 
and relationships. A considerable literature is available covering these 
particular techniques and without doubt the most Indicative of 
deterministic continuity is that of psychiatry, just as Hospers says. A 
complete exposure of the formative elements which have combined to 
bring about a person's particular psychological attributes is reachable by 
an expert psychiatrist, sometimes to the amazement and in itia l disbelief 
of the patient concerned.
The Important point here Is not only that the deterministic sourcing of 
particular psychological attributes can be ascertained but also that those 
attributes can be greatly changed in a desired direction as an outcome 
from the revelations. The sequence of cause and effect is obvious, the past 
clearly determining the present and the future in that past forces 
determine present properties of the brain and thereby psychological 
attributes and the techniques of the psychiatrist determine future 
properties and attributes.
It is appropriate at this point of the presentation of some of the 
psychophysical evidence to refer to statements by others which have a 
bearing upon the relationship between the theory of deterministic monism 
and the identity theory. In doing so, yet another argument pointing to the 
truth of the deterministic identity theory becomes evident.
The particular argument referred to is based upon the fact that almost 
everything which certain prominent philosophers, e.g., Strawson,(3) Ayer,(4) 
Bennett(5) and Hobart(6) have to say on the subject of responsibility or 
accountability for human behaviour is in effect a statement which 
supports the truth of determinism. All note that decision-making, to the 
extent that it  is not deterministically tied to past phylogenetic and 
environmental forces, can only be a random, meaningless occurrence and 
consequently that the concept of responsibility in conventional terms 
would not be applicable in such a case. As Ayer puts it, "Once more, either 
it  (O.e., my choice or my character)) is an accident or it  is not. If i t  is an 
accident, then by the same argument as before, I am not morally 
responsible, and i f  it  is not an accident we are led back to determinism."(7)
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What Ayer and the others are noting Is that functioning of the human brain 
in accordance w ith the principle of determinism is necessary for the 
ascription of responsibility in any significant terms. To the extent that 
decision-making is not deterministically sourced, it  can only be random 
and meaningless and ascription of responsibility in conventional terms 
cannot be justified.
This is a situation which, i f  responsibility is to mean anything at all, can 
only be interpreted as once again pointing to the truth of determinism.
Further, Ayer's statement is not merely a statement regarding 
responsibility. It is also, in effect, a statement that a ll human 
decision-making is sourced deterministically and, even more, that 
deterministic functioning of the brain is necessary for logical thought, 
logical communication and meaningful relationships. To the extent that the 
brain does not function deterministically, thought and communication 
cannot be logically related from instant to instant and relationships 
cannot be meaningful.
None of the above is enough to formally prove that the principle of 
determinism and the identity theory are accorded w ith in the realm of 
psychology but the empirical evidence supports that interpretation far 
more than any other.
It has been claimed that the effect of the quantum upon the course of 
human behaviour lies below the level of observability and therefore 
confirmation or refutation. However, the inescapable fact is that there is 
no empirical evidence whatsoever -  either in brain processes or in fe lt 
experience - to indicate that small effects of quantum dimensions play 
any part in the course of functioning of the brain and the opposing 
argument is tota lly without empirical support. Once again, it  is the 
increasing predictability of human thinking and behaviour that is the 
substantial and significant factor and the opposing claim is li t t le  more 
than a clutching at straws to support a philosophical stance.
It would increasingly appear that one can justifiab ly  rephrase one of 
Newton's laws and say that every human being always thinks and behaves 
in a specific, predetermined way unless conditioned by a new force to 
change that way. In other words, every human being is totally and always a 
prisoner of the past.
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7.2 Self-hood and Intersubjectivity
Descartes' statement, "I think therefore I am." can be held to have given 
authoritative standing to the commonly held belief that self-hood or 
I-ness Involves the existence of some kind of homuncular entity - 
Descartes' "I” -  which exists apart from the body. The belief Is of course 
contrary to the Identity theory and is one reason why the theory has gained 
l i t t le  conscious acceptance w ithin even philosophical and scientific  
circles. The identity theory 'goes against the grain' of the sense of self.
However, the empirical evidence indicates that the occurrence of the 
processes of cognitive consciousness of the external world on the one hand 
and a sense of self as a further development of cognitive consciousness on 
the other proves nothing other than that the brain has memory, sensory and 
cognitive powers which enable i t  to discern and interpret the existence of 
the external world -  including that part of the external world which is the 
human body. The occurrence is an outcome of the phylogenetically sourced 
capabilities of the brain and of sensory interrelationships between the 
brain and the external world.
In particular, there is the empirical evidence which indicates that the 
mentalistic state of the brain which is the sense of self is closely related 
to the condition of the brain, both as regards the effects of age and the 
effects of damage, surgical operation and drugs. Gardner's work is 
particularly informative regarding the extent of this relationship and in 
clarifying the distinction between mere cognitive consciousness and its  
extension, the sense of self. His extensive experience in the realm of brain 
damage and surgical modification has led him to the conclusion that 
"Owing to these and other deficiencies, the frontal-lobe patient ((i.e., the 
patient who has lost the use of the frontal lobes of his brain)) - even 
while scoring inpressively on objective tests of skills  and knowledge - 
strikes us instantly and in tu itive ly as bereft of a sense of self, 
unconscious of his life, deprived of a metaphor in which his activ ities and 
his worth are recorded, or at least of the ab ility or the incentive to 
consult this record."(1)
Gardner compares such a patient w ith  other patients who have retained the 
frontal lobes intact while "being crippled in so many of the sensory and 
motor capacities." He notes that, in such a case, "His sense of self, his 
concern about what he can and cannot do, his ab ility to confront and make 
decisions, have been diminished li t t le  if  at all." and that "It is because 
most aphasic patients retain their frontal-lobe structures that they, too, 
even when paralysed and almost mute, retain the dignity of the sense of
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self."®
It is to be noted here that such a highly localised and close relationship 
between the brain w ith frontal lobes on the one hand and cognitive 
consciousness w ith the sense of self on the other is evidence that 
supports the identity theory rather than substance or property dualism. 
Such a localised, close relationship between the ’mental1 and the ’physical’ 
is contrary to the basic assumption of both forms of dualism that the 
mental and the physical involve either separate substances or separate 
properties, these standing in different relationships with the external 
world and therefore differently affected by change either in the 
interrelationships w ith the external world or change in the internal 
structure or functioning of the brain as in the case of the loss or lack of 
development of the frontal lobes.
There is further empirical evidence against any attempt to argue on a 
priori grounds that the sense of self is indicative of the existence of some 
kind of homuncular 'self', fundamentally independent of the body and 
thereby indicative of the fa ls ity  of the identity theory.
One element of this further evidence is that of the historicity and 
evolutionary sourcing of the psychological attributes of human beings. The 
mode of becoming should be of vital concern in the formulation of any 
theory of the fundamental properties and significance of human existence. 
To attempt to explain that existence as i f  the world had been put into 
place overnight exactly as i t  is today and without the billion years of 
evolutionary development from the most elementary life-form s of the 
past is to side w ith creationist fantasies.
The empirical evidence indicates that the reality of the position is 
entirely different and the difference can be held to be of considerable 
significance in formulating an explanation of the incidence of the 
mentalistic reportings of the properties of the brain which we describe as 
cognitive consciousness of the external world and its  extension, a sense 
of self. In particular, the evolutionary picture is one of exceedingly slow 
incidence and development of the complexity of the brain's properties and 
thereby the psychological attributes of human beings. At no point in the 
palaeontological record of the past four m illion years is there evidence of 
an overnight incidence of any particular psychological attribute and i t  can 
only be concluded that the incidence of a sense of self is nothing other 
than a further evolutionary development following upon the evolutionary 
development of the cognitively conscious, ’raw feel’ properties of the 
brain which human beings have in common with all other animals.
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Sellars has put together a plausible picture of how the sense of self f irs t  
appeared as an outcome of the evolution of the properties of the bra1n.(3) 
This can be summarised here as evolutionary development from the 
earliest form of non-verbal communication to the Incidence of elementary 
overt speech, from more developed forms of overt speech to 'Inner speech', 
l.e., thoughts without corresponding overt speech; then from thoughts and 
overt descriptions about others, e.g., "He Is sick." to thoughts and overt 
descriptions about oneself, e.g., "I am sick." It could be expected that a 
sense of self would be the ultimate outcome of the process, provided that 
adequate conceptual power had also developed In the frontal lobes of the 
brain where that power Is now known to be located. It would be surprising 
and Illogical to acknowledge the occurrence of sensory power, 
Interpretative power, speech communication and conceptual power In the 
human animal and not expect that combination to bring about conclusions 
regarding the animal's own place In the world.
However, to know that the brain processes which have led to cognitive 
consciousness and subsequently a sense of self are not Indicative of any 
duallstlc significance Is not the whole story. There Is s t i l l  a need to 
position them in depth in an appropriate setting and, for this purpose, the 
mode of incidence can be examined along the lines followed by Sellars. 
Considerations of major importance are revealed In doing so.
The most important of these by far is the relationship between 
intersubjectivity and the development of the brain's properties and 
thereby the attributes of the human psyche -  in particular, the incidence 
of the sense of self as a highly evolved element of the human psyche. 
Several w riters have drawn attention to the need for interrelationships 
between the brain and the world external to the brain before psychological 
attributes of any 'personal' significance can occur at all, the history of 
such thinking going back to the assertions by Locke and Rousseau as to the 
mode of acquisition of psychological attributes, l.e., personality tra its , 
and being continued today in the works of such w riters as Sellars, T.Nagel 
and Gardner.
Not that all such w riters follow precisely the same line of argument. 
Locke and Rousseau w rite only of the close relationship between the 
formation of the psyche and the forces which condition that formation, 
the implication being clearly that there would be only extremely lim ited 
formation i f  there were no external determining forces whatsoever. 
Cognitive consciousness as consciousness of the external world and of 
interrelations with that external world and, without doubt, a sense of self
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would then presumably be very largely non-existent, suggesting once again 
that the human psyche has no inner stand-alone ontological significance in 
its  own right.
Sellars, Nagel and Gardner develop this assertion of the essentiality of the 
relationship between intersubjectivity and the development of the human 
psyche further and the importance of the relationship is more than enough 
justifica tion  for quoting their most pertinent and informative statements 
here.
After putting forward his very plausible story of how our ancestors - 
whom he individualises in the person of a fic titio u s  man, 'Jones' - came to 
acquire a sense of self and other such 'personal' attributes, Sellars makes 
the following statement "As I see it, this story helps us to understand that 
concepts pertaining to such inner episodes as thoughts are primarily and 
essentially inter-subjective, as inter-subjective as the concept of a 
positron, and that the reporting role of these concepts - the fact that each 
of us has a privileged access to his thoughts -  constitutes a dimension of 
the use of these concepts which is bu ilt on and presupposes this 
inter-subjective status."(4)
One of Nagel's statements is pertinent to this exposition of the importance 
of intersubjectivity in the formation of a 'person'. "There is s t il l another 
point: many intensional predicates do not just ascribe a condition to the 
person himself but have implications about the rest of the world and his 
relation to it. Physicalism w ill of course not require that these be 
identical simply w ith states of the person's body, narrowly conceived. An 
obvious case is that of knowledge, which implies not only the truth of 
what is known but also a special relation between this and the knower. 
Intentions, thoughts and desires may also imply a context, a relation w ith 
things outside the person. The thesis that all states of a person are states 
of his body therefore requires a liberal conception of what constitutes a 
state - one which w ill admit relational attributes."(5)
Nagel is less sweeping than Sellars in pointing to the importance of 
interrelational conditioning in the coming into being of a 'person' but there 
is no doubt about the strength of his claim that intensional predicates of a 
particular subject are a function of the conditioning of that subject and 
consequently that what a person is, and what the state of a person is - his 
intentions, thoughts and desires - is a function of interrelationships w ith 
the particular environment which the person has been subjected to up to 
that particular point of time.
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Gardner’s extensive study of the effects upon the human brain, and thereby 
upon the human psyche, caused by injury or surgical operation to the brain 
provides direct empirical evidence regarding the particular nature and 
extent of the relationship. He concludes that the evidence does not support 
the dualistic homunculus theory but that "Careful examination of human 
development suggests instead, that the formation of the sense of self, of 
the feeling of a 'mind' in touch w ith and In command of an individual's 
behaviors and actions is a bootstrap operation, one aided by peers, by the 
language, by the surrounding culture, indeed by the individual’s total 
interaction w ith  the world.M(6)
A special case of the evidence indicating that the human psyche is much 
more of an intersubjective than a subjective phenomenon is that of Helen 
Keller.
When Anne Sullivan f irs t  tried to bring the external world into 
communication w ith the brain of the deaf, blind and dumb human organism 
that was to become Helen Keller, there was no response whatever to 
indicate that the organism was any kind of 'person'. At that stage, Helen 
was merely a functioning organism in the class of organisms to which 
plants and colonies of ants and bees belong. All bodily functions were 
occurring normally but there was no evidence of the existence of a ho listic 
'person', only the occurrence of two gestures to convey to the external 
world her need for food or drink.
Anne Sullivan te lls  of how, after many fu tile  attempts to establish some 
kind of communication w ith 'Helen', she fina lly succeeded. She impressed a 
meaningful language, that of a finger alphabet, upon Helen's remaining 
sensory faculty of potential value to communication - touch. In this way, 
she was able to substitute finger for spoken words and the feeling of an 
object for the sight of it. Helen's subsequent acquisition of a vocabulary 
and fina lly of conceptual thought was unbelievably fast in the judgment of 
that brillian t naturalist, Konrad Lorenz.(7)
Nevertheless, what we must be careful not to assume here - the age-old 
homuncular and dualistic delusion - is that 'Helen Keller' was in there 
somewhere just waiting to appear once the door was unlocked. There was 
only the potential for a person, Helen Keller, to take form. No Anne 
Sullivan and there would never have been a person, Helen Keller, at any 
time - only a biological, almost to ta lly non-psychological organism.
Ascription of any kind of homuncular independence under such highly 
lim ited conditions is, to say the least, highly questionable and, i f  i t  is
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highly questionable under such conditions, then its  supposed dualistic 
significance under fu lly  developed conditions can be given l i t t le  credence. 
That which is acquired merely by phylogenetic and environmental inputs 
cannot have fundamental dualistic significance. The only element in such a 
situation that is fundamentally significant would appear to be the 
capacity of the brain to acquire properties which are reportable as parts 
of the human psyche and this is a property of the fundamental constitution 
of the Universe, not a property of some kind of dualistic self.
As Lorenz notes, following Darwin, Chomsky and Eibl-Eibesfeldt in 
particular,(8) that potential capacity is innate in the human race to an 
enormous degree now - as was evidenced by the rapidity w ith which Helen 
Keller acquired an extensive vocabulary and understanding of a whole 
culture. In Lorenz's words, "We do not learn to think, we learn the symbols 
for things, like a vocabulary, and the relationships between them. What we 
have learnt we then set into a preformed framework without which we 
would be unable to think -  indeed, without which we would not be human 
beings at all. But there are hardly any circumstances that illustra te the 
presence of these various mechanisms so vividly as the simple and 
completely unbiased description for which science is forever deeply 
indebted to Anne Sullivan.',(9)
Although i t  could be held that this innate capacity could be explained 
equally validly on dualistic grounds, the evolutionary and biological 
evidence indicates that determinism and monism is a more logical 
description of the situation, i.e., that the innate capacity of the human 
brain for learning and understanding is an evolutionary-sourced property 
attached to the organism, man, as a particular biological/psychological 
property. Thus the person that Helen Keller fina lly became was an outcome 
of the interplay between the particular innate properties of her brain and 
the particular intersubjective sensory inputs to her brain. Different innate 
properties and different sensory inputs would have produced an entirely 
different person, ranging over the whole spectrum of the human race.
The empirical evidence is therefore very much to the effect that a 'person' 
is a biological/psychological state of the body and not anything else. Helen 
Keller was not a person until she became such in the course of Anne 
Sullivan's providing a path for the forces of intersubjectivity to take 
effect in combination w ith the innate properties of Helen Keller's brain.
Lorenz gets down to the ontological 'root' of things when he makes two 
very meaningful statements in the same genre as those above. "Everything 
we know about the material world in which we live derives from our
63
phylogenetically evolved mechanisms for acquiring information, 
mechanisms in fin ite ly  more complex than those which e lic it the avoidance 
response of the paramecium but developed according to the same 
principles."00* Also, "The simple answer is that the system of sense 
organs and nerves that enables living things to survive and orientate 
themselves in the outer world has evolved phylogenetically through 
confrontation w ith an adaptation to that form of reality which we 
experience as phenomenal space. This system thus exists a priori to the 
extent that it  is present before the individual experiences anything, and 
must be present i f  experience is to be possible. But its  function is also 
historically evolved and in this respect not a priori."01*
The la tte r statement is particularly meaningful along the line taken 
w ith in the present study. As Lorenz says, all human 'experience', i.e., all 
states of cognitive consciousness and a sense of self, follows upon the 
evolution of mechanisms which are capable of having that experience. 
These mechanisms have evolved from more elementary mechanisms and 
the more elementary mechanisms from even more elementary mechanisms 
down to the most fundamental properties of the Universe, whatever they 
were at the time of the nominal f irs t  state.
This is a corollary of Lorenz's statement by merely extending the 
'historical' term of his statement to its  ultimate monistic and 
deterministic base. Once one concludes (following Lorenz) that innate 
properties of the brain are evolved properties of more complex forms of 
the fundamental 'substance' of the Universe and occur only in gradual 
measure as those more complex forms evolve into existence, there is 
l i t t le  justification for claiming that the occurrence of any property of the 
brain and thereby any psychological attribute is evidence of the occurrence 
of any form of independent homuncular entity.
Yet again, it  must be concluded that the human psyche is a deterministic 
product of the properties of the fundamental constitution of the Universe 
and of nothing else.
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7.3 The incidence of 'human' emotions
L ittle  has been said as yet to account, in terms of determinism and 
monism, for the incidence of the emotions which are also a mark of the 
human psyche - aspiration, joy, despair, devotion, etc, and three others, 
awe, religious feeling and sadism, which are perhaps the only emotions 
unique to man since all others clearly appear to also be attributes, in some 
degree, of some other animal. Lorenz is notable among those who te ll us 
something of the emotions which motivate other animals and the evidence 
should shake the confidence of anyone who claims that human beings are 
something fundamentally above the animal world.(1)
Awe, religious feeling and sadism could well be held to be unique to human 
beings but this is scarcely to establish any kind of divine significance to 
man. The evolutionary history of the animal world shows the evolutionary 
process operating on both the capacity to reason and to feel and there is no 
empirical evidence supporting any claim that the occurrence of awe, 
religious feeling and sadism is not just another stage in the evolutionary 
process. The evolutionary development of the human capacity to reason is 
well revealed by the palaeontological evidence extending over the past 
four m illion years and highly significant steps in the evolution of emotion 
are also shown by the palaeontological evidence -  that of the f irs t 
r itu a lis tic  burial customs around 100 000 years ago(2) and, even more 
significantly perhaps, that of the burial of an adult invalid who could not 
have survived without the care of other members of his group.(3)
The palaeontological evidence of man's attributes prior to 100 000 years 
ago reveals nothing of any such emotional content. All the evidence is to 
the effect that earlier man was driven only by the same forces as drove 
every other animal -  food, shelter, sex and the protection of the young.
Some, of course, might claim that the time of incidence of the f irs t 
ritu a lis tic  burial customs and the f irs t  caring for the welfare of others 
was the time when man was f irs t imbued with the 'divine' sp irit and 
became something above the animal world but other empirical evidence 
does not support such a claim. In particular, i t  would appear from that 
evidence that man is the only animal w ith highly developed sadistic 
tendencies - enjoying the discomfiture and pain of others. Even some 
forms of comedy depend largely upon this attribute of human beings and 
history is fu ll of the more savage forms -  victim isation and sadistic 
treatment of the weak by the strong in every possible and conceivable way 
and there is l i t t le  evidence of any change even after many millenia of 
so-called civilisation. The drifting smoke from the ovens and the living
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scarecrows of Belsen, Auschwitz, Dachau and other German extermination 
camps are stark evidence of that and one does not have to look beyond the 
thuggery and viciousness in one's own community for other evidence.
Man's psyche today has the attributes of caring, awe and religious feeling 
but i t  s t il l retains much of the characteristics of his past struggle for 
survival. Violence was necessary for that survival during his evolutionary 
past -  the more effective the killing, the more certain the survival -  and it  
is s t i l l  very much part of his psyche today so any contention that he was 
imbued 100 000 years ago or at any other particular time w ith any kind of 
divine spark must take account of the failure at that time to imbue him 
w ith  a fu ll measure of kindness and concern for the welfare of others. 
Self-interest -  either during life  or in some supposed hereafter -  rather 
than concern for the welfare of others, continued to be his most 
dominating attribute.
More logically, the incidence of r itua lis tic  burial customs and caring for 
the welfare of others can be explained as a predictable outcome of the 
process of natural selection. The animals which survived during the 
competitive evolutionary process were those w ith advantages relative to 
other animals under the particular environmental conditions appertaining 
at any given time. One of those advantages, particularly for animals which 
are at a competitive disadvantage as individuals - and man was certainly 
one of these - was to function as a group. Lions and wolves are other 
examples.
Under such conditions, personal welfare could well have become identified 
w ith group welfare to an extent and group welfare could well have become 
identified w ith  concern for other individual members of the group. Species 
and groups which did not have this further competitive advantage would 
have died out.
This concern for the welfare of other members of a group is to be seen 
today in the case of other animal forms which function cooperatively, e.g., 
dolphins and k ille r whales, and man cannot claim any uniqueness for his 
own characteristic of caring for the welfare of others.
In the case of awe and religious feeling, a plausible explanation of their 
incidence in the evolution of man would appear to stem from the incidence 
of curiosity in the human psyche. Curiosity would have been a natural 
selection advantage in that it  led to new means of survival and it  has 
become a phylogenetically sourced innate attribute of higher animal 
forms, quickly appearing in the psyche of the young. With such an innate
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drive to explore and understand the functioning of the world, the vastness 
of the unknown in the extent of time, in the extent of space and in the 
extent of the mystery of our being could not have failed to impress sooner 
or later and to be consciously aware of vastness is the essence of awe. 
Also, to be consciously aware of one's own existence in the face of the 
lim itless unknown is the essence of religious feeling.
It is more d ifficu lt to find a logical explanation for the incidence of 
sadism in the functioning of the animal world yet a plausible explanation 
needs to be found to account for the incidence of sadism in the human 
psyche that does not imply a dualistic irreducible source. At some point in 
the evolution of mankind, circumstances occurred which led to the 
incidence of sadism and it  should therefore be possible, in accordance 
w ith  the principles of determinism and monism, to explain that incidence 
logically in terms of the evolutionary process.
Once again, we are drawn to the nature of the evolutionary process for a 
likely explanation. The drive to survive was the primary motivating force 
throughout the whole course of animal evolution until man became an 
agricultural being some 10 000 years ago and survival thereby became 
assured as far as food supply was concerned for the f irs t time in man's 
evolutionary history. Until that development, it  was the actual survival 
that mattered to the animal and there was nothing in the situation to bring 
about sadistic enjoyment of another animal's pain. Satisfaction was 
complete when the means of survival was effected and the sooner the 
effect, the sooner the satisfaction. This is well-known to be the situation 
'in the wild' today; animals k ill their prey quickly and do not prolong the 
process.
It could perhaps have been expected that a bountiful, agricultural way of 
life  w ith its  much greater survival value would have led to more benign 
and mutually beneficial relationships but evidently not so. The competitive 
drive - honed and intensified during m illions of years of natural selection 
- was not to be evolved out of the human psyche in a mere 10 000 years of 
societal cooperation. Clearly, it  has remained and appears not only in the 
readiness of mankind to resort to blood sports such as bull-fighting and 
fox-hunting for enjoyment and to violence and war as the means of 
settling disputes or gaining an advantage but also in the characteristic 
drive for power over other human beings and other animals - and sadism 
would appear to be an extreme form of expression of that power.
On this interpretation, it  would appear that the incidence of sadism in the 
human psyche was a consequence of the frustrations imposed by the
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security of agricultural life  upon the human animal which had acquired a 
highly pronounced disposition towards violence and the exercise of power 
over enemies and prey during the course of evolutionary natural selection 
over millions of years. To in flic t pain sadistically upon another human 
being or other animal is to pander to that disposition when there is no 
longer any other means of doing so. We are all victims of our evolutionary 
past.
What we have been briefly arguing above is that no human emotional 
attribute can be held, on the available evidence, to be indicative of the 
incidence of any kind of emergent, irreducible 'divine' property of man as 
compared w ith other animals. Only awe, religious feeling and sadism 
appear to be unique to man but i t  would appear that the incidence of these 
can be plausibly explained on an evolutionary basis. There is certainly no 
case for claiming that any other emotional attribute of the human psyche 
is unique to man, all other kinds of emotional attributes being found in 
some other animal, even though in lesser measure, and it  is 'kind' that is 
significant, not 'measure'.
We can only conclude that the empirical evidence is very much to the 
effect that no human emotional attribute is unique to man in any way 
which indicates i t  is an irreducibly emergent or supervenient attribute, 
not sourced determ inistically in the past and thereby, ultimately, in the 
nominal f irs t  state.
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PART IV THE DETERMINISTIC IDENTITY THEORY 
6. Concept ond content
8.1 Introduction
PART II of the study wos very largely an evaluation of the analytic edifice 
that is put forward in support of the traditional Identity Theory. It led to 
the conclusion that the theory, although of considerable value in acquiring 
an understanding of the meaning of the statement that a 'mental' state is 
identical to a 'physical' state and in arguing that the statement is not 
false a priori, nevertheless is neither complete nor convincing as to the 
truth of the statement. This is evidenced by the various points of dissent 
expressed by many philosophers, such as A rm s tro n g ,K rip ke /2) Boyd/3) 
Popper/4^  Shaffer/5) Davidson/6^  C.Campbell/7) Stevenson^ and Dennett(9) 
etc.
PART II also evaluated the most prominent analytic objections and found 
no reason to reject the theory on the grounds of any of the objections.
PART III referred in short measure to the pertinent empirical evidence but 
extended only marginally into the realm of hypothesis and metaphysics 
based upon that evidence.
PART IV goes further. It takes account of the content of PARTS II and III 
and attempts to derive a comprehensive and compelling theory of 
consciousness, being and knowable reality based upon both the analytic 
arguments and the empirical evidence presented in those parts. Section
8.1 is directed to recapitulating and further developing the most 
significant conclusions reached as an outcome of the arguments and 
evidence i.e., that the Universe is a single entity or system, functioning 
deterministically and sourced entirely and solely in the nominal f irs t 
state and that a 'mental' state is identical to a ’physical’ state.
The concept of the nominal f irs t state was introduced in order to truncate 
considerations of the evolutionary process to a particularly significant 
point in ontological time and thereby enable the study to concentrate upon 
the realm of which science has appreciable understanding. The point taken 
on this basis was that immediately preceding the Big Bang, the primary 
plasma state, a 'singularity' or whatever else is conventionally taken to be 
the primary state of the Universe.. At that point, i t  would appear from the 
scientific evidence that the constitution of the Universe was a single, 
universal ‘substance’ or force ((This alternative is hereafter usually
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designated solely os 'substance* but implies all possible forms of energy.)) 
which has since changed and evolved in accordance w ith certain 
deterministic laws of change.
On this basis, the evolution of the Universe subsequent to the nominal 
f irs t  state was held to be the deterministic, non-emergent and 
non-supervenient evolution of states of the fundamental substance and the 
accompanying evolution of the properties of the fundamental substance 
when in the various states. According to this line of argument, the various 
states include all the localised or nodal concentrations of the fundamental 
substance which we know as a wave/particle, a quantum of radient 
energy, a molecule, a cell, a plant, an animal, a planet, a solar system and 
a galaxy etc etc and also include all the states of the part of the Universe 
which is designated as a human being.
The particular statements above are the framework within which any 
theory of the relationship between a mental state and a physical state 
must be set, according to the line of argument. In particular, i t  was 
concluded that all parts of a deterministically functioning, monistic 
system stand always in a deterministic relationship w ith each other. 
Separate streams, e.g., separate streams w ith distinctive mentalistic and 
physicalistic substances or properties, could occur, functioning in 
accordance w ith laws which, although different from each other on some 
distinctive basis, are nevertheless part of the one overall deterministic 
set of laws.
It was noted in the study that Honderich is one who has propounded such a 
theory, based, in his case, upon the truth of determinism and the division 
of properties into the 'mental' and the 'physical'. He attempts to reconcile 
s tr ic t individual determinism, property dualism as involving separate 
mentalistic and physicalistic properties of the brain - closely correlated 
but causally interrelated - and universal commonality of some kind as a 
corollary of the truth of determinism.
Honderich's theory, which he has called the Union Theory, therefore 
accords w ith two of the definitive elements of the deterministic identity 
theory as expounded in the present study, i.e., (1) that the functioning of 
the Universe is totally deterministic and monistic and (2) that 
individuality is a transient state, the eternal reality being that of some 
kind of universal commonality.
It is in his claim - and the claim of many other philosophers today - that 
the 'mental' and the 'physical* are separate properties of the 'material' of
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the brain, closely correlated and causally Interrelated, that Honderich's 
theory differs fundamentally from the deterministic identity theory and it  
is this difference which has been one of the crucial questions and 
subjects of investigation in the present study. The other has of course 
been that of the probability of the truth of s tr ic t individual determinism.
The investigation as to the credentials of the identity theory as compared 
w ith those of property dualism was carried out, firs tly , by evaluating the 
analytic arguments previously put forward as to whether or not the 
identity theory is false a priori, secondly, by attempting to strengthen the 
analytic case arguing that the identity theory is not false a priori, and, 
thirdly, by evaluating the pertinent empirical evidence as to the 
relationship between a mental state and a physical state.
It was concluded that the following three statements are well justified;
(1) The most prominent analytic objections to the analytic arguments put 
forward by the traditional identity theorists in support of the identity 
theory are not convincing.
(2) A definite and significant difference of meaning between the terms of 
the statement of identity of a mental state and a physical state is 
provided by the distinction between the mental being known a priori and 
incorrigibly and the physical being known only a posteriori and 
contingently. On this basis, the meanings of the terms of the statement of 
identity of a mental state and a physical state are clearly and 
significantly different, the statement of identity is a contingent 
statement involving different modes of picking out the referent - in this 
case the brain - and the statement of identity cannot be held to be false 
on analytic grounds. Its truth or fa ls ity  can be established only 
empirically.
(3) The empirical evidence is all to the effect that nothing more is 
required for the occurrence of a particular mental state than the 
occurrence of a particular physical state. In other words, there is either 
an identity relationship between a mental state and a physical state or 
such a close correlation of the two states that any independence is totally 
undetectable under all conditions of occurrence and therefore 
indistinguishable from an identity, tota lly non-causal relationship. Such 
an alternative is purely speculative.
It was concluded from the above considerations that the probability of the 
truth of a theory which takes account of both determinism and the
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identity theory is much greater than that of any alternative and the 
resulting theory - designated as the deterministic identity theory - is 
explicated in the following sections of the study.
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8.2 The deterministic Identity theory: o total theory
We ore now in o position to stote specifically whot is the content of the 
deterministic identity theory.
The deterministic identity theory stotes that the fundamental 
constitution of the Universe is a single, universal ’substance' or force; 
that the structure and functioning of the Universe accords w ith the 
principles of monism, determinism and conservation of energy; and that a 
’mental' state of a part of the Universe is identical to a 'physical' state of 
that part, the mental state being picked out and known a priori and 
incorrigibly and the physical state being picked out and known a posteriori 
and contingently.
The essential point is that the Universe is a single, deterministically 
functioning entity or system, structured fundamentally on the basis of 
some kind of universal commonality, and that the occurrence of a 
particular mental state of a part of the Universe, i.e., any of the 
'experiences' thought, desire, fear, pain, sense of self etc in the case of a 
human being, is identically the occurrence of a particular physical state 
of that part. The two states are nothing other than different modes of 
picking out, reportings, meanings and knowings of one and the same 
referent, the ultimate reality being in the fundamental properties of the 
Universe which give rise to those particular modes, reportings, meanings 
and knowings and in nothing else.
The deterministic identity theory differs from the traditional Identity 
Theory significantly in that i t  is a prime element of the deterministic 
identity theory that the mentalistic reporting of the holistic properties 
of the brain is reducible, in the ultimate, to reporting the mentalistic 
properties of the substance that is the most fundamental level of the 
brain’s constitutional hierarchy. It is this particular relationship to the 
fundamental substance of the Universe which, together w ith the principles 
of monism, determinism and conservation of energy, transforms the 
deterministic identity theory from being merely a theory of the 
relationship between a mental state and a physical state to being a total 
theory of consciousness, being and knowable reality.
It is a total theory - making statements about the fundamental structure 
and functioning of everything that exists as a knowable part of the 
monistic entity that is the Universe, about the peripheralistic world of 
naive realism of which we are a part from day to day and about the 
relationships between the fundamental and peripheralistic worlds. There
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is no realm of knowable reality or field of philosophical or religious 
concern which is beyond its  scope or relevance.
In accordance with the analytic arguments, the empirical evidence and the 
deterministic identity theory derived from those arguments and that 
evidence, the key to acquiring a much more comprehensive understanding 
of everything knowable would therefore appear to be twofold; (a) 
recognising that the Universe is a to ta lly deterministic and monistic 
entity or system and (b) recognising that a mental state is a particular 
state of existence of a particular part of this monistic entity or system 
and not some kind of irreducible supervenient or emergent and im p lic itly  
dualistic entity or property, exclusively associated w ith human existence. 
We must diminish our appraisal of ourselves at the peripheralistic level 
in order to understand ourselves more thoroughly and comprehensively at 
more fundamental levels.
In the case of (a), the state of the Universe at any time - including the 
state which is characterised by the occurrence of human beings - is an 
evolutionary outcome from the nominal f irs t  state. From the properties of 
that nominal f irs t state, all subsequent states have deterministically 
evolved according to the theory - common as in the case of the gaseous 
mass which the evidence suggests was the Earth at the time of its  in itia l 
formation, communal as in the case of ant and bee colonies and composite 
as in the case of animals and plants. The nominal f irs t state was the 
source in all cases and all cases are nothing other than different facets of 
the state of the Universe at any particular time.
In the case of (b), an individual human 'person' is an integral part of the 
Universe and can be nothing more in the case of a totally monistic and 
deterministically functioning entity. Personal significance or lack of 
personal significance is then the significance or lack of significance of 
the Universe and there is no basis for ascribing any kind of irreducible 
significance to human existence. Either the Universe is a totally monistic 
entity or system functioning in accordance w ith the one ’principle', i.e., 
set of laws, or it  is not. If i t  is such an entity or system, all forms of 
knowable duaiism involving systems functioning in accordance with 
fundamentally different sets of laws are axiomatically refuted and the 
fundamental significance of being can be found in the fundamental 
significance of the Universe and not in anything else.
A particular consequence of the above statements is that a human being 
does not 'possess' states of consciousness and states of being. T.Nagel has
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seen f i t  to moke this point in terms of the occurrence of poin; he denies 
that there ore two referents - one the person ond the other the poin, w ith 
the person possessing the poin.(1) He is here identifying on importont 
element of the deterministic identity theory but, once ogoin, is only 
touching the fringe of the totol theory. A ‘person’ does not possess poin, 
thought or ony other form of consciousness according to the theory. The 
person is those experiences ond sensations os impressed upon some kind 
of ’ground-stuff’, os Schroedinger colls it ,  ond which we con take here to 
be the unfoshioned or unmarked ond therefore unpersonolised state of the 
broin. Those experiences ond sensotions ore in trinsic in what o ’person’ is. 
When they do not exist then neither does the person.
Hume is one who hod something of o grip upon this particular 
interpretation but even he speaks, in a well-known statement, in terms of 
a person experiencing rather than of the experiencing being the person. 
’’For my port, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at 
any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the 
perception. When my perceptions are removed for ony time, as by sound 
sleep, so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. 
And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, 
nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I 
should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite 
to make me a perfect nonentity.1*2)
Although Hume speaks constantly here in terms of a personalised T having 
the perceptions, i t  is clear that his underlying intention is to reject the 
claim that the perceptions are possessed by a person. Elsewhere, in the 
same work, he makes this point clear. ”1 may venture to affirm  of the rest 
of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other w ith an inconceivable rapidity, and 
are in a perpetual flux and movement.'*3)
Which is not to say that there is not something - a part of the Universe - 
which exists and is changed in some way by the afferent sensory inputs. 
It is a matter of logical necessity that there must be such a something 
w ith in the realm of the monistic entity that is the Universe or we would, 
once again, have to conjure up some kind of dualistic entity or realm 
which is affected by the inputs. There is no empirical evidence of this.
As stated above, the part of the Universe that exists and is changed by the 
afferent inputs - Schroedinger's ’groundstuff’ - is of course the brain. But
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there is nothing in the situation which indicates that the brain is a person 
that reacts to the inputs; the empirical evidence is all to the effect that a 
person is the form which the reaction to those inputs takes - without the 
inputs, there is no reaction and no person, only a human organism w ith the 
potential for personhood.
On this basis, two elements are necessary for the occurrence of a 
particular person; the particular, evolutionarily sourced ground-stuff w ith 
all the innate capabilities which have come down from previous 
generations and pre-life  forms of the fundamental substance of the 
Universe, right back to the nominal f irs t state; and the afferent sensory 
inputs which condition the ground-stuff w ith the effects of all the 
environmental forces which operate upon a particular individual at a 
particular point in the evolutionary process - parental, educational, peer 
and cultural. Both elements are necessary fo r the occurrence of a person 
and no person eventuates i f  either of the elements ore missing.
Under these conditions, a 'person' is the reporting of a particular set of 
properties of a particular, evolutionarily sourced part of the Universe - 
the brain - after the afferent sensory inputs to the brain have taken 
effect. The reporting includes the reporting of the particular set of 
properties of the brain when frontal lobes are an effective integral part, 
the reporting then being the sense of self.
The point here is that, in the case of a deterministic, monistic entity, all 
properties and states are outcomes of the deterministic evolutionary 
process and are therefore evolved properties and states of the 
fundamental substance or force of the Universe. It is a totally 
self-contained and totally deterministic process and the occurrence of a 
particular person is therefore an outcome of a deterministic evolutionary 
process. This involves, firs tly , a large number of steps including the 
evolutionary past of the Universe from the nominal f irs t state up to the 
point of occurrence of the fertilised human ovum - containing within its  
chromosomal and DNA structure an implant of both its  phylogenetic 
history and directive growth control fo r the future states of the 
organism; secondly, biological growth of the human organism up to the 
point of birth including conditioning of the organism by inputs from the 
environment w ithin the mother up to that point; and, thirdly, biological 
growth subsequent to birth and conditioning of that growth by sensory 
inputs from the external world. The outcome - a human person - is a 
product of phylogenetic and conditioning forces and of nothing else and, 
consequently all the attributes of a human person are also a product of 
phylogenetic and conditioning forces and of nothing else.
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In sum, i t  follows from the above considerations that a person can only be 
a product of the deterministic process; he or she cannot be a power or an 
entity outside that process.
The sense of self that is the reporting of the properties of the brain w ith 
effective frontal lobes also needs to be clearly placed w ithin the context 
of consciousness and being according to the deterministic identity theory 
i f  we are to reach a comprehensive understanding. Some philosophers have 
been baffled by the thought that the world could apparently function 
exactly as i t  does, even though cognitive consciousness to the point of 
occurrence of a sense of self was completely absent from the scene.
The position according to the deterministic identity theory is that a world 
could certainly exist and function without the occurrence of cognitive 
consciousness to the point of a sense of self - indeed that life  on the 
Earth was such a world until the processes of evolution brought about 
higher animal-forms w ith properties of the brain reportable as being a 
sense of self.
However, the Universe as i t  actually now is, is obviously not such a world. 
There is now one highly significant a priori certainty - the existence of 
something that is cognitively conscious to the point of self-awareness - 
Descartes’ ’I think, therefore I am.’ in different terms. Everything else is 
reached only by contingent physicalistic reportings and only to the extent 
possible within the constraints of the deterministic process.
Hence, according to the analytic arguments and the empirical evidence, all 
forms of cognitive consciousness i.e., emotions, thought and a sense of 
self, are products of the deterministic process exactly as everything else. 
They are indicative only of the fundamental properties of the Universe and 
not of the existence of any entities fundamentally independent of the 
deterministically functioning, monistic entity or system that is the 
Universe according to the deterministic identity theory.
77
8.3 Holism, panpsychism and commonality
The deterministic identity theory is a statement of the fundamental 
structural and functional properties of the Universe and of the 
relationship between the ’mental’ and the ’physical'. Although such a 
theory impacts upon every other element of human knowledge, i t  is 
essentially only a framework and, for a comprehensive understanding of 
all the properties of the Universe, i t  needs to be ‘fleshed in' w ith a great 
deal of further analysis.
One of the most important questions requiring attention is that of the 
relationship between the properties of the most fundamental realm - 
whatever that is - and those of the micro realm and the macro realm that 
brings about the holistic properties of particular parts of the macro realm 
which are reported as mentalistic and which thereby provide evidence for 
the statement that the Universe is a panpsychic entity in commonality and 
reductionist terms.
One point is of major importance in our search for an answer - or even a 
mode of approach - to this question. When we consider the historical and 
evolutionary sequences that invariably lead back deterministically to the 
nominal f irs t state according to the empirical evidence, there is no escape 
from the conclusion that the sourcing of holistic properties which can be 
reported or described as mentalistic lies in the properties of the nominal 
f irs t state and that every state of the Universe since that nominal f irs t 
state must equally be the source of such properties.
Which means that panpsychism, if  defined in monistic and reductionist 
terms, is an appropriate term with which to designate the fundamental 
constitution of the Universe.
It has been claimed that the theory of panpsychism is obviously 
questionable in that the theory implies that inanimate objects are 
conscious but the implication does not follow from the theory if  this is 
defined in monistic and reductionist terms. The state of physicalistic 
occurrence of an individual object, e.g., a human being, that is identically 
a state of consciousness can involve other fundamental properties of the 
Universe and only occur when the juxtaposition of properties is such as to 
bring about that state. Whether or not the state of consciousness occurs 
for states of physicalistic occurrence of parts of the Universe other than 
that of human and other animals is a question which is very probably 
unanswerable by beings whose range of knowledge is lim ited to that 
reachable by the deterministic process.
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AH that can be claimed with confidence is that, i f  the Universe is entirely 
a deterministic and monistic entity and if  consciousness occurs as a state 
of part of the Universe at any level or in any form, i t  must be reducible to 
a state of that part at any other level or in any other form. It is not a 
corollary of this position - and thereby of panpsychism - that 
consciousness must be a state of occurrence of every object, inanimate or 
animate, any more than any other characteristic of any part of the 
Universe must be a characteristic of every part. Evolution is not such a 
process.
Which also means, once again, that there is no basis for claiming that 
properties which are reportable as mentalistic are sourced in some kind 
of irreducibly supervenient or emergent creationist occurrence. They are 
sourced only and totally in the nominal f irs t state and the nominal f irs t 
state must have had the properties necessary for the occurrence of every 
state of every part - or the whole - of the Universe that has ever occurred 
or ever w ill occur.
The reference here to creationism is pertinent as there appears to be 
something of a hankering after an emergent form of creationism on the 
part of some philosophers - a coming into existence of properties which 
are not reducible to and are not evolved from the fundamental properties 
of the Universe. According to this particular thesis, something entirely 
irreducible and unpredictable has somehow emerged, either as some kind 
of non-deterministic, unpredictable and unretrodictable evolutionary step 
or as a creative act by an external power.
There is no incontrovertible analytic argument or demonstrable empirical 
evidence that such a step ever occurred, however, and the emergent form 
of creationism can be rejected as completely as its big sister, 
creationism in the form of a lite ra l interpretation of the Bible. The 
empirical evidence is now enormously to the effect, and increasingly so, 
that all states of the Universe are sourced entirely in previous states 
right back to the nominal f irs t state and consequently back to whatever 
preceded that nominal f irs t state.
We are le ft with the question as to what are the properties of the 
fundamental substance of the Universe which have brought about the 
particular holistic properties of human beings today which are reported 
as mentalistic.
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The question con be divided into two ports, one concerned w ith the 
ultimote significonce of the properties of the fundomentol substonce of 
the Universe - ond the ultimote significonce of the Universe itse lf - ond 
the other concerned w ith the mechonics of the Universe - in this cose, 
w ith the mode of evolutionory formotion ond the constitution of the 
holistic properties of more complex ports of the Universe.
The f irs t question resolves itse lf into the question of how i t  is thot the 
Universe with its  porticulor properties exists rother thon nothing ot oil 
ond is olmost certoinly unonsweroble by humon beings.
The other question con ot leost be deolt w ith to some extent todoy ond o 
point of greot significonce is immediotely reveoled in the process. The 
porticulor point is thot the holistic properties which ore reported os 
mentolistic ore properties which become more complex os the complexity 
of the port of the Universe concerned becomes more complex. They ore not 
o function of one porticulor ond unique port of the Universe such os the 
humon broin todoy. According to the empiricol evidence, elementory forms 
of the properties ore distributed throughout the reolm of onimote motter, 
ossembloge of the more elementory forms of onimote motter into complex 
forms merely bringing obout more complex holistic properties, reportoble 
os being more complex mentolisticolly. An obvious cose evidencing this 
effect is thot of the development of intelligence os the size,structure ond 
content of the pre-hominid, hominid ond humon broins hove developed 
during the course of evolution.
Most recently, os olreody noted in sections 7.2 and 8.2 above, there has 
been the development of conceptual power, ond thereby the sense of self, 
os o function of the development of the frontal lobes of the broin which 
ore so characteristic of the cranial structure of Homo Sapiens
What we ore claiming here is that the mentolistic reporting of the 
properties of ports of the Universe is demonstrated by the empirical 
evidence at least back to extremely elementary life-form s and there is no 
reason, on the available empiricol evidence, to reject the claim that the 
nominal f irs t state had properties which were reportable as being 
mentolistic in some fundamental form and which could bring about more 
complex mentolistic states ot ony subsequent time thereafter whenever 
conditions were suitable. On this basis, the deterministic identity theory 
is not merely o statement thot the Universe is o monistically sourced, 
deterministicolly functioning system todoy with properties, ot certain 
'higher' levels of evolutionory development, thot ore reportoble os 
mentolistic but also o statement that the Universe hos always been ond
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w ill always be such a system. It is only as to what makes the properties 
of particular parts of the Universe such that they are reportable as 
mentalistic that human knowledge has as yet failed to reach anything 
more than the the most tentative of hypotheses.
One such hypothesis is that by Schroedinger; "The only possible 
alternative is simply to keep to the immediate experience that 
consciousness is a singular of which the plural is unknown; that there is 
only one thing and that, what seems to be a plurality, is merely a series of 
different aspects of this one thing, produced by a deception (the Indian 
Maja); the same illusion is produced in a gallery of mirrors, and in the 
same way Gaurisankar and Mt. Everest turned out to be the same peak seen 
from different valleys."W
In other words, the mentalistic reportings which are attributes of certain 
individual life-form s are evidence of an underlying commonality and 
universality of properties which are of the mentalistic kind, the mode of 
evolutionary development from commonality to individuality and the 
relationship between commonality and individuality being a crucial and 
outstanding problem of ontology.
The problem is examined further in the next section in terms of the 
constitution of individuality and self-hood.
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8.4 Individuality, self-hood and commonality
Attention has already been drawn to the probable mode of incidence of the 
sense of self - that i t  is an extension of or a particular form of cognitive 
consciousness and is identical to a state of the brain when frontal lobes 
are an effective integral part. Individuality and self-hood therefore d iffe r 
from each other only in that individuality is the particular set of 
structural and functional properties which differentiate one part of the 
Universe from all other parts whereas self-hood is the form of 
individuality which includes a sense of self.
However, this is merely a peripheralistic element of the occurrence of 
individuality and self-hood and does not account for that occurrence in the 
most fundamental and comprehensive terms. What am T that everyone else 
is not - quite independent of whether or not there is any development of a 
sense of self - is a basic question which must be analysed more fu lly  than 
previously in the study in any attempt to reach an understanding of the 
fundamental constitution of individuality and self-hood.
The following statement by Schroedinger is generally and increasingly 
believed to be true within philosophical circles concerned with the 
philosophy of science; "What is this T? If you analyse i t  closely you w ill,
I think, find that it  is just a li t t le  more than a collection of single data 
(experiences and memories), namely the canvas upon which they are 
collected, and you w ill, on close introspection, find that, what you really 
mean by T, is that ground-stuff upon which they are collected.
The question here is what is the constitution of that " lit t le  more" and how 
li t t le  is it?  To reach something of an answer, i t  would appear that two 
particular elements of the problem need to be examined;
(1) the relationship between, on the one hand, phylogenetic and 
environmental forces and, on the other, the constitution of individuality 
and self-hood and
(2) the relationship between, on the one hand, the holistic unity of a 
plant, an ant or bee colony or a composite animal organism such as a 
human being and, on the other, the fundamental properties of the Universe 
that have given rise to these forms of holistic unity.
The f irs t of the elements listed above that need analysis is that of the 
relationship between phylogenetic and environmental forces on the one 
hand and the constitution of individuality and self-hood on the other. 
Perhaps the empirical evidence most devastating to the commonly held
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assumption that individuality in the form of self-hood is somehow an 
eternal state is that, as Schroedinger points out, there is no element of 
personality or behaviour which is not a function solely of phylogenetic 
and/or environmental forces. The closeness of the type-type relationship 
is evidenced by the close token-token relationship between particular 
phylogenetic and environmental forces on the one hand and particular 
'mental' and 'physical* characteristics on the other of each and every 
member of the human race. Every human being is clearly a product of his 
phylogenetic origins and of his environment, and the particular 
characteristics which mark his individuality and, under normal conditions, 
his self-hood are always ascribable, w ith enough knowledge, to particular 
phylogenetic and environmental forces.
This being so, our analysis reaches a conclusion equivalent to that by 
Schroedinger; the characteristics of individuality and self-hood are a 
peripheralistic function of phylogenetic and environmental forces and are 
individual only to the extent that the forces are individual. If all 
individuals were formed by exactly the same phylogenetic and 
environmental forces, they would have exactly the same personal 
characteristics, i.e., be perfect clones of each other.
Yet there would s t il l be something that differentiated between the 
individual clones - the something being their different spatial positions in 
the Universe and each clone independently being cognitively conscious of 
the external world. Delete the effect of all the phylogenetic and 
environmental forces and something s t ill remains - the part of the 
constitution of the individual that is the something which is moulded or 
impressioned by the forces. This is of course Schroedinger’s 'ground-stuff 
and perhaps also the 'l-ness' which Hofstadter is thinking of when he asks 
"Why can't my l-ness belong to some other body?"(2) provided that 
Hofstadter is ascribing l-ness to what is being conditioned rather than to 
the conditioning. But what could be transferred from one body to another 
i f  all the characteristics of individuality had been deleted?
Which is not to say that there is nothing le ft that could be transferred but 
there would surely be l i t t le  point in doing so if  all the characteristics of 
individuality had been deleted and the l i t t le  more is merely a part of the 
fundamental substance of the Universe. The constitution of individuality 
would be merely a conditioning of part of that fundamental substance by 
phylogenetic and environmental forces.
That this is the most logical interpretation of the empirical evidence is 
further supported by what is clearly an endless m ultip lic ity  of life-form s.
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In particular, there is no logical reason to assume a lim it to the number of 
people who could be born, live and die, each a product of the particular 
phylogenetic and environmental forces applying at the particular point of 
evolutionary time. One explanation of this apparent in fin ity  of possible 
people appears to be more logical than any other - they are all essentially 
the one thing and i t  is in this one thing - the entity that is the Universe - 
where permanence and ultimate significance lies, not in the ephemeral, 
peripheralistic manifestations.
On this basis, Schroedinger's 'l i t t le  more' is the Universe as a whole and 
the 'soul' of a person is the ‘soul1 of all people.
The above considerations appear to eliminate the last possibility of 
determining something permanently individual that is the T of self-hood. 
If this is the reality of the position, i t  could be held that commonality is 
universal and timeless and we are somehow at all places and at all times 
w ith individuality an illusion born of naive realism. This in effect is the 
gist of the following statement by Schroedinger: "But not in this sense - 
that you are a part, a piece, of an eternal, in fin ite  being, as aspect or 
modification of it, as in Spinoza's pantheism. For we should then have the 
same baffling question: which part, which aspect are you? what, 
objectively, differentiates i t  from the others? No, but, inconceivable as i t  
seems to ordinary reason, you - and all other conscious beings as such - 
are all in all. Hence this life  of yours which you are living is not merely a 
piece of the entire existence, but is in a certain sense the whole."(5)
Such a hypothesis is of course highly speculative even though i t  is 
reasonably well supported by the available empirical evidence. At least 
the probability of its  truth can be held to be greater than that of any 
alternative put forward to date in philosophical deliberations. In any case, 
i t  does not provide a perfect answer to the question since it  says nothing 
in regard to the mechanics of the relationship between individuality and 
commonality. As noted in section 8.3, this is judged by Schroedinger to be 
one of the most d ifficu lt problems of all in the search for an 
understanding of the constitution of self-hood.
Nevertheless, the hypothesis does provide something more of an answer to 
the question of what am I which everyone else is not? On the available 
evidence and in accordance with the commonality interpretation of that 
evidence, the answer would appear to be nothing as far as the fundamental 
constitution of my individuality and self-hood is concerned. The evidence 
indicates only that we are all essentially one and the same entity and 
never anything else and that the only significance and permanence which
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we con ascribe to ourselves is the significance and permanence of that 
common entity - which, of course, according to the deterministic identity 
theory, can only be the Universe as a whole.
The second element of the basic question is concerned w ith the 
relationship between holistic properties and the constitution of 
organisms and i t  raises a number of important questions in its  own right - 
notably that of in what significant way are the holistic properties of 
human beings different from those of an ant or bee colony. A human 
organism is sim ilarly a concentration of directive forces controlling the 
functioning of a molecular and cellular assemblage -  differing, i t  would 
seem, from the ant or bee colony only in that the cells of a human 
organism perform different tasks than in the case of the cells of which 
the ants and bees are composed. This does not appear to be a difference of 
a highly significant kind. The holistic property is surely the only property 
of any significance vis-a-vis the question of the constitution of 
individuality and self-hood and this property occurs, even i f  different, in 
both cases.
Hofstadter finds great significance in the holistic ordering of events in 
the case of an ant colony and he is prepared to ascribe the same holistic 
feature to the phenomenon of the b ra in ^  while Davies points out that 
holistic phenomena entail reductionist relationships and refers to Bohm 
as one who has attempted to formulate a holistic form of physics in an 
endeavour to account for holistic phenomena in fundamental terms.(5) 
Hofstadter, Davies and Bohm are all thereby further evidencing the current 
attempt in science and the philosophy of science to understand the 
reductive relationship between holistic properties and the fundamental 
constitution of the Universe. Such an understanding would further support 
the claim that individuality and self-hood are explicable fundamentally 
only on a commonality basis.
One point regarding the relationship between holistic properties and the 
fundamental constitution of organisms is beyond dispute; whatever the 
particular difference between the holistic properties of the human 
organism and those of an ant colony is, the empirical fact remains that 
the two cases are different forms of the same phenomenon - that of the 
occurrence of properties beyond those of the individual constituent 
elements merely grouped together. In both cases, the whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts - a statement which is not lim ited in its  
applicability to animate matter but extends throughout both animate and 
inanimate realms of the Universe. An atom has holistic properties which 
far surpass the properties of its  sub-atomic elements standing alone.
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Sim ilarly in the case of an individual molecule, a cell and the human brain. 
In all cases, internal relationships bring about holistic properties which 
would not exist i f  those internal relationships did not occur.
What can the fundamental constitution of individuality and self-hood be 
under these reductionist conditions? If the properties of the brain are 
holistic properties of the brain's constituents which have come together 
in a certain way, they are holistic properties of all levels of constitution 
of the brain, i.e., of the molecular structure, of the sub-atomic particles 
and of the fundamental substance of the Universe that is the fundamental 
level of constitution of the brain. The basic constitution of individuality 
and self-hood can then be nothing other than a holistic property of the 
fundamental substance of the Universe just os the holistic properties of 
an ant or bee colony can be nothing other than holistic properties of the 
fundamental substance of the Universe. In all such cases, there is nothing 
apparent in the situation that provides support fo r any theory other than 
that of some kind of fundamental commonality.
We have now carried out a short analysis of important aspects of the 
question as to what is the constitution of individuality and self-hood and, 
in no case, have we been able to locate any element which could be held to 
be indicative of the existence of any kind of individual ’self' as an 
independent, permanently existing entity. Always the indications are to 
the effect that individuality and self-hood ore merely particular 
transitory characteristics of a particular transitory concentration of the 
fundamental substance of the Universe. On this basis, individuality and 
self-hood are functions of the fundamental commonality of the Universe 
and individual beings have properties which are reportable as mentalistic 
solely because the fundamental properties of the Universe ore inherently 
reportable as mentalistic in some way.
In other words, all properties of all states of existence of the Universe - 
and all reportings of those properties - are sourced only in the properties 
of the nominal f irs t state.
As for what the properties of the fundamental substance might be that are 
responsible for the properties of individual beings being reported or 
reportable as mentalistic, no one has as yet been able to formulate a 
theory in anything like informative terms . Schroedinger can do no better 
than to say, "If we decide to have only one sphere, i t  has got to be the 
psychic one, since that exists anyway (co g ita t-e s t).^  There is obviously 
much more to the subject than that but i t  would be inappropriate to 
attempt to go further into the question as part of the present study as
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such on attempt would be l i t t le  more than highly speculative. All that has 
been attempted in the present study is to highlight the analytic arguments 
and empirical evidence that have been leading, w ith ever increasing 
weight, towards a more deterministic and monistic formulation of the 
identity theory than heretofore.
T.Nagel puts the position bluntly; **! therefore doubt that the terms for 
expressing the two sides of a physicalist identity are at present 
available; and the development of physiological psychology could leave us 
w ith terms so tied to a common theory that any true identities we tried to 
formulate would be tautological. None of this is an objection to 
materialism, but i t  suggests that the formulation of that doctrine needs 
to progress beyond the terms of the traditional identity theory.”^
What is missing from Nagel’s paper is recognition of the fundamental 
commonality of the Universe. Recognition that the Universe is a 
deterministically functioning, monistically sourced entity or system with 
fundamental properties which can give rise to the a priori mentalistic 
reporting which is designated as self-awareness has far reaching 
implications in regard to individuality, consciousness and being and these 
implications stand irrespective of the answers to the questions which 
Nagel addresses. Everything in the analytic arguments and the empirical 
evidence is for, and nothing is against, the statement that the 
fundamental constitution and significance of individuality and self-hood 
is to be found only in the fundamental commonality of the Universe and in 
nothing else. On this basis, we are what the Universe is and we exist in 
one form or another just as long as the Universe exists in one form or 
another - which, on the evidence and on the only logical interpretation of 
that evidence - cannot be other than eternally.
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9. The deterministic identity theory ond human offoirs 
9.1 Introduction
Previous sections of PART IV of the study hove been on explication of the 
content of the deterministic identity theory os on ontology of 
consciousness, being ond knowoble reolity but l i t t le  hos been soid 
regarding the relationship between thot theory ond the world of noive 
reolism of which we ore on integral port from doy to doy. To provide o 
description of the sourcing, fundomentol structure ond mode of 
functioning of the Universe os o whole ond of human offoirs os port of the 
Universe is not necessarily to provide o complete description of human 
affairs. To achieve thot, we hove to relote oil that we know regarding the 
underlying structure and mode of functioning of the Universe to the same 
elements of human offoirs ond achieve such on understanding of the la tte r 
that predictability of individual, community and world affairs - the 
schemata of logical necessity - con be matched accurately to the 
deterministic realities.
To carry out such a project to the point of perfect predictability would 
obviously not be merely a mammoth but an impossible task. We do not 
have, ond never w ill have, adequate knowledge for achieving such an end 
even though an impressive level of predictability - and, to that extent, 
verification of the principle of determinism - has already been achieved in 
the realm of science and technology, including to a significant extent, the 
realms of biology and psychology.
Further, many a world figure has made use of his knowledge of the 
processes which have operated in the history of mankind to plan his moves 
for the future. The saying that history repeats itse lf is a reflection of the 
determinacy unconsciously assumed as the mode of functioning of human 
affairs - pointing once again to the predictability of human affairs if  
enough knowledge was to hand regarding all the relevant factors. Given the 
same or effectively equivalent factors, the same outcome is bound - and 
is found - to occur.
However, the question here is not that of establishing the truth of 
determinism in the realm of human affairs. That would be obvious 
circularity since the instant-by-instant predictability of day by day 
human affairs, i.e., of the realm of naive realism, has been presented as 
part of the evidence pointing to the truth of the principle of determinism.
The question here is that of to what extent has conscious and unconscious
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awareness of the principle of determinism and the identity theory already 
been a factor in determining the course of human events and to what 
extent can a continuation and further development of that process be 
anticipated in the future. If i t  ever came fu lly  to pass - and the trend is 
certainly in that direction - such a self-reflexive process by mankind in 
toto would be the ultimate case of Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem. It 
would involve, on the one hand, awareness that the structure and 
functioning of the world is entirely monistic and deterministic and, on the 
other, the empirical fact that the world is structured and functions on 
that basis - a mixing of subject and object which places complete 
knowledge only at the end of an in fin ite  regress and, even more, i f  carried 
to the lim it, would change the principles of sound thinking radically.
Detailed considerations along this line are beyond the scope of the present 
study except to the extent outlined in section 9.3 below but certainly 
warrant exhaustive analysis in a further study. The following sections of 
the present study deal only w ith particular cases where there has already 
been significant change in the human outlook towards acceptance of the 
truth of determinism, monism and/or the identity theory and where there 
are clear indications of further such change. Such changes w ill, sooner of 
later, lead to detailed consideration of the self-reflexive implications and 
thereby to the above-mentioned radical transformation of the human 
outlook.
One of the cases involves the relationship between the thinking of an 
individual human being, determinism and the thinking of mankind in 
general. In a world functioning deterministically, every statement and 
decision made by everyone is a deterministic outcome from memory 
content, afferent sensory inputs and processing by the brain and is an 
expression of individuality only to the extent that these three ingredients 
of the making of a particular decision occur in a particular brain. None of 
the ingredients is of the person’s own making and therefore neither is the 
decision.
Thus, in a world functioning deterministically, no claim can be made as to 
non-deterministic originality for any advance in human knowledge. The 
claim that all the great advances in human knowledge have been due to the 
occurrence of individuals w ith special, unique properties of the brain is 
true, on the evidence, only to the extent that particular individuals happen 
to be the focus of a particular state of commonly held knowledge and 
thereby individual memory content; of particular afferent inputs; and of 
particular processing capability of the brain. The efferent is solely a 
function of phylogenetic and environmental forces and occurs in a
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particular individual only because that particular individual happens to be 
the f irs t  w ith the necessary memory content, afferent inputs and brain 
processing capability. As direct evidence supporting this statement, there 
is the frequent co-occurrence of sim ilar scientific discoveries at more 
than one location in the world.
What we are emphasising here, as a corollary of the deterministic identity 
theory, is the deterministic functioning of the world of every day human 
affairs - that the functioning of an individual human being is part of the 
deterministic evolutionary process and is nothing other than part of the 
process. The evolutionary process is the fundamental reality and its  
‘surfacing1 in a particular brain is peripheralistic to the process just as 
the whole cultural state of a community is a surfacing of the 
deterministic evolutionary process at a particular place and time and can, 
w ith ever increasing accuracy, be accounted for in terms of the particular 
environmental conditions appertaining at that place and time. The 
individual state is deterministically sourced in the community state and 
the community state is deterministically sourced in the state of 
knowledge and environmental conditions.
Once we accept that the properties of individuality are deterministically 
sourced in the properties of commonality - in particular, in the properties 
of a community as a whole and thereby in the properties of the underlying 
evolutionary process (and thereby again in the properties of the nominal 
f irs t  state), attention can be focussed upon the properties of a community 
and the evolutionary forces which have determined those properties.
What we are both observing and being caught up in today is a massive 
dominance of, and changing of, the human world and the human outlook by 
the discoveries of science and the inventions of technology - evidencing 
once again that there is nothing in the process which can be held to be of 
non-deterministic origin.
So, if  the process today is entirely deterministic and is dominated by the 
discoveries of science and the inventions of technology, where does it  
appear to be heading other than towards more disillusionment and disorder 
on the one hand and more knowledge and a new outlook on the meaning of 
life  on the other? To recognise that the world functions deterministically 
is to raise questions of tremendous importance which have only been 
touched upon in recent scientific and philosophical literature. A whole 
new realm of scientific and philosophical investigation is waiting to be 
dealt w ith as a consequence of general acceptance of the truth of 
determinism, monism and the identity thesis - consequences as to the
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place of man in the Universe; the constitution of being; religion; 
responsibility; morality; law; conditioning of the thinking and behaviour of 
others; self-conditioning etc etc. Earman, Strawson, Bennett, Ayer and 
Wolf - following d’Holbach of two centuries ago - are among those who 
have touched upon some aspects of these questions but, without doubt, 
future philosophers w ill be driven to be far more concerned w ith such 
questions as the deterministic functioning of the Universe and the world 
of human affairs becomes ever more accepted - consciously or 
unconsciously.
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9.2 The deterministic outlook and linguistics
To accept the truth of a theory such as the deterministic identity theory 
would be one thing. For that truth to become fu lly integrated into the 
human outlook and behaviour would be quite another. There would be 
massive changes in a person's outlook, both towards others and towards 
himself or herself, primarily in the direction of the withering away of the 
traditional dualistic assumption that each of us is some kind of possessor 
of and originator of our thoughts and emotions and the substitution of the 
view that we are those thoughts and emotions and nothing individual else 
and also that they have been derived deterministically and tota lly from 
the past.
It is remarkable that the empirical evidence pointing to the truth of this 
statement - so apparent in so many fields of observation - has been so 
disregarded or misrepresented in the past and is only now beginning to 
condition human thought and behaviour as the predictability of the 
functioning of the Universe, human affairs and the individual human being 
impacts ever more greatly upon human thought. What is s t ill very largely 
lacking - and no doubt w ill remain lacking for many generations to come - 
is a highly considered application of such thinking to questions of 
responsibility, morality, law etc.
There is also something more - the problem of language being constantly 
phrased in terms which imply the existence of a possessor of the thought 
process and of everything else which is considered to be the mark of an 
individual human being or 'person'. It has been said that we cannot escape 
from the linguistic trap in which we exist from the time of birth - that 
all changes in the content of thought are no more than changes to 
linguistic conventions. However, this is not to diminish the value of human 
thought any more than to formulate a concept regarding the structure or 
functioning of the Universe in mathematical terms is to diminish the 
value of that concept.
Nevertheless, there is a particular disability today in that the linguistic 
representation of the world very strongly reflects traditional beliefs and 
conditions human beings to acquire those beliefs right from birth - and, 
even worse, to acquire highly divisive refinements of those beliefs. Not 
even the most thorough-going determinists have been able to avoid 
phrasing their statements in terms which imply a dualistic, 
anthropocentric structure to reality w ith the essence of a human being 
presented as some kind of separate entity or 'self', functioning 
independently of the laws w ith which the functioning of the rest of the
92
Universe accords.
To express the deterministic position more precisely, statements would 
have to take fu ll account of the fact that, in a monistic and 
deterministically functioning world, man is an integral part of the 
Universe and of the evolutionary process and that representing the 
epistemological relationships linguistically as if  they are between 
himself as an independent agent and the external world as something 
merely acted upon is inconsistent w ith the fundamental relationships 
involved.
This has not occurred in the past simply because there was li t t le  need for 
language to reflect anything other than the complexities of the day by day 
interrelationships between people and between people and their 
immediate environment. It is only now, when man is looking more deeply 
into the fundamental constitution of reality, that the question has arisen 
as to how language could more accurately take account of the new 
knowledge, notably that of determinism and monism, which is beginning to 
impact so noticeably upon man’s understanding of the structure and 
functioning of the world.
Such a mode would have to d iffe r significantly from the subjective and 
objective modes in which the human brain currently functions 
linguistically at the present time. The subjective mode is framed in terms 
of the impact of the external world upon the subject brain and the 
objective mode is based upon an attempt to view the world as would a 
totally uninvolved being from another Universe. The deterministic mode 
■would, however, d iffe r from the subjective and objective modes - 
particularly because these tend to imply a form of dualism involving a 
homuncular being or 'l i t t le  man’ in the brain which is either acted upon or 
is standing aside from the world. The deterministic mode would be framed 
ideally in terms which avoided any such implication. The classic case of 
both the subjective and objective modes is of course that of Descartes 
who gave the term T the significance of an independent homuncular 
entity and thereby initiated a considerable part of subsequent 
philosophical thought.
On the other hand, Hobart has already indicated how simple statements 
such as "I produce my volitions.' which imply the existence of some kind of 
dualistic, free w ill being could be rephrased as "My volitions are produced 
by me.' to have something more of a deterministic and monistic 
connotation.^ ’My' and 'me' in such a case would merely be referring to the 
particular human being without denoting a separate entity w ithin that
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human being which is exercising the function of producing volitions.
Apart from change of phraseology to avoid or minimise dualistic, 
non-deterministic implications, there is the particular question of the 
meaning and usage of key words such as moral responsibility, free w ill, 
praise and blame which have in the past strongly implied a 
non-deterministic significance to at least part of reality. Nowell-Smith(2) 
and E.Nagel^ are two who have considered the matter, both concluding 
that a general acceptance of the truth of determinism would have 
relatively l i t t le  effect upon what is denoted by such terms, The same acts 
would retain the same descriptive terms and only the connotations of the 
terms would change in accordance w ith the new understanding. The terms 
praise and blame would lose any religious significance but would continue 
to be used for acts which were either beneficial or detrimental to the 
general or individual good.
Nowell-Smith puts i t  very clearly; "We are faced, then, w ith a choice 
between altering the connotation and altering the denotation of the word 
'free*. For my part I should unhesitatingly choose the former. It is always 
dangerous to monkey w ith the denotation of a word, since it  is d ifficu lt to 
remember that we must no longer use i t  to apply to the things i t  has 
always been applied to. Could we, without confusion and self-deception, 
learn to say of what appears to be a deliberate action that i t  was not 
free? Even i f  we could, we should only be depriving ourselves of a very 
useful word. On the other hand, there is far less strain involved in learning 
to say The actions that have always been called free are s t il l to be called 
free; only now, thanks to Freud, we know better in what our freedom 
consists.' We are already fam iliar with the way in which the connotation 
of a word changes as knowledge develops; and the alteration does not 
greatly change the connotation of 'free'. Two of its  most important logical 
liaisons - namely, those with 'doing what I want to do' and with 'being 
responsible' - remain unaffected.
Free w ill would be a particular case, the words coming to connotate 
merely lack of external constraint in the performance of an act. 
Constraint by innate psychological properties, childhood indoctrination, 
environmental influences etc would be excluded from the linguistic usage 
of the words but the part played by these forces in determining behaviour 
would be fu lly recognised and accepted. An analogous case is that of the 
sun rising and setting in general parlance whereas i t  is now understood 
that the phenomenon is due to the rotation of the Earth and not to any 
movement by the Sun. Another case is the current application of the word 
miracle to events of an unexpected and highly modifying nature which
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would previously have been ascribed to divine intervention. The word 
denotes the same event but the connotation has changed as people have 
become more knowledgeable as to the true causes of events.
The most significant change would be that of the impact of the general 
acceptance of the truth of the elements of the deterministic identity 
theory upon the linguistic representation of the fundamental content of an 
individual human being. Since the truth of the principles of determinism 
and monism would imply that individuality is a transitory phenomenon 
associated w ith the state of life  and that some form of commonality is 
the more fundamental and eternal state, i t  could perhaps be expected that 
the traditional concept of an individual ‘soul' would change radically - in 
particular, lose its  significance relative to that of the state of 
commonality.
However, there does not appear to be the slightest possibility of any such 
change, at least not in the foreseeable future. Awareness of one's 
existence as a separate, highly individual being during life  is far too 
intense for that. Far more likely, the linguistic representation of the 
fundamental content of an individual human being would continue to be 
that of the 'soul', the connotation being the same as that of the individual 
'soul' during life. There would be l i t t le  need for the connotation to change 
greatly fo r existence after life  since the loss of individuality then would 
not mean the loss of 'se lf, only transformation of this into some more 
universal form - the common essence or 'sp iritua lity ' of everything that is 
a part of the Universe as conveyed in the words of Schroedinger "We living 
beings are all simply sides or aspects of one single Being; a conclusion 
with which, as I have said, I, w ith Albert Schweitzer, am very w illing to 
agree."(4)
All of the various changes of connotation noted above are already 
occurring. They are being promoted by the continuing discoveries of 
science which all point in the same direction - towards the deterministic 
unity of the whole of the Universe. The multitudinous intellectual 
aberrations which have come to f i l l  the void le ft in many outlooks by the 
developing demise of the traditional forms of religion and associated 
philosophy - disastrous as this has been during the 20th century and may 
well be during the 21st - cannot ultimately prevail against the sharp edge 
of scientific truth.
In any case, fu ll acceptance of the truth of the elements of the 
deterministic identity theory and any consequent changes to the linguistic 
forms would not diminish the sense of personal identity w ith which each
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human being looks out upon the world. Each would s t ill be a conscious 
centre of the world and meet very much the same emotional situations 
during life. There would be more than enough reason to continue to use the 
existing personalised linguistic forms but w ith different connotations to 
take account of the deterministic and monistic reality.
Probably the most noticeable effect of general awareness and acceptance 
of the truth of the principle of determinism, in particular, would be that 
upon the completeness of logical thought. A line of reasoning which does 
not take account of the deterministic sourcing of one's own thinking is a 
process which lacks an important element. A line of reasoning which took 
appropriate account of that sourcing could well lead to a different 
decision in that at least more of an attempt would be made to look at the 
matter objectively. Also, the process of thought in general would be 
conditioned by such an approach to look more deeply into the evolutionary 
sourcing of all events and decisions, unjustified truncating of the causal 
chain being minimised and understanding being enhanced thereby.
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9.3 Conditioning and self-conditioning
By for the most distorting self-deception which effects humon offoirs is 
that of the assumption that each person is of his or her own making and is 
responsible for his or her decisions and behaviour. The scientific and other 
empirical evidence indicates that human thought and behaviour are tota lly 
determined by the phylogenetic and environmental forces operating.
Two corollaries of the statement need emphasising; f irs t, the corollary 
that, in a world functioning deterministically, any conditioning of, i.e., 
effect upon, that world by anyone is an outcome of that person having 
already been conditioned by the phylogenetic and environmental forces 
operating. A deterministic sequence of events, including brain events, 
cannot be other than continuous and unending right back to the nominal 
f irs t state. Second, a person who is an integral part of a deterministically 
functioning, monistic system can never hope to fu lly  understand and 
predict the future state of the system since what he knows can never 
exclude the effect of the involvement of himself.
The complexities arising from this second lim itation are daunting and, in 
their to ta lity , clearly far beyond our intellectual capacity to take account 
of fully. Every time there is a need to make a decision regarding any 
matter, three aspects need to be taken into account if  we wish to reach 
the most rational outcome;
(1) The known facts
(2) Awareness that our own thinking about the matter has been determined 
by the particular phylogenetic and environmental forces which have 
operated upon us, i.e., every matter is looked at w ith the eyes of the past
(3) Awareness that any adjustment that might be made to the 
decision-making process in an attempt to take account of (2) is also 
totally determined and can never be more than a step in an in fin ite  regress 
of adjustments and therefore that a complete understanding of all the 
factors cannot be reached before the decision is made.
Aspect (3) is a paradoxical situation which prevents anyone from ever 
making a decision which is independent of his or her own personal history 
and the particular phylogenetic and environmental forces which have been 
the cause of that particular history. This situation is seldom recognised in 
either individual or public decision-making but has been formalised in 
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.
Nor is aspect (2) except to the extent that we are prepared to concede 
lack of or reduced responsibility for persons showing pronounced brain
97
derangement. We otherwise take li t t le  account of phylogenetic and 
environmental influences when ascribing responsibility and almost 
invariably ignore even the obvious relationship in that the so-called good 
are typically those who are fortunate in the phylogenetic and 
environmental forces which have formed them and the so-called bad are 
typically those who are unfortunate.
The reality, in a world functioning deterministically, is that character and 
behaviour are solely deterministic functions of phylogenetic and 
environmental forces and change in one or other of these forces is 
necessary for change in character and/or behaviour. No change in the 
forces and character and behaviour remain unchanged.
The deterministic relationship between character and behaviour on the one 
hand and phylogenetic and environmental forces on the other is 
particularly apparent in the conditioning we are all subjected to from the 
moment of f irs t sensory input to the moment of death - conditioning as 
children; students; manipulated members of society; psychiatric or 
psychotherapy patients; sports aspirants etc etc.
As already noted in section 7.1, the statement 'Give me a child until he is 
seven and I'll have him all his life.' is a well-known statement indicating 
the impressionability of the human brain to carefully organised 
conditioning at an early age. It is also a statement which is highly 
denigrating of the significance and value of the characteristics of 
individuality, evidencing most forcefully the deterministic process which 
conditions the human brain to the point of a 'person' being no more than a 
reflection of the phylogenetic and environmental forces operating at any 
particular time in man's evolutionary history.
Thus, we become a Roman Catholic or a Mohammedan or a Jew-hater or an 
atheist or a human vegetable or a deranged maniac etc etc and we stay 
that way unless some new force comes into play - meeting a new way of 
thinking, needing to think differently because of some change of 
circumstance or the brain being changed as a result of age, injury, 
drug-taking or an operation etc. The world of mankind is fu ll of very 
specific examples illustrating the claim that a person is what he is and 
thinks what he thinks solely as an outcome of the particular set of 
phylogenetic and environmental circumstances which made him what he is 
and what he thinks - none of the circumstances being of his own making. 
As Hospers says "He is a victim of a world he never made - only this world 
is inside h im ."^
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This is whot the empirical evidence clearly indicates and what the truth 
of the deterministic identity theory would imply - that we are all totally 
programmed from the nominal f irs t state and, consequently, to the extent 
that we understand the forces acting upon the thinking and behaviour of 
people, to that extent we have ourselves already been conditioned and may 
have also been conditioned to attempt to modify the thinking and 
behaviour of other people along particular lines.
The effectiveness of indoctrination, psychiatry and psychotherapy and the 
vast amount of experimentation in the fie ld of behaviour of other animals 
- rats, dolphins, chimpanzees etc - is only possible because of this, i.e., 
the fact that, when we set up a specific situation, we always get a 
specific response and the fact that our knowledge is great relative to the 
complexity of the situation. As our knowledge about all the forces 
affecting the situation increases, so does our ab ility to predict and 
modify the behaviour of other human beings and other animals. Clearly, 
there is no discernible lim it to the possibilities. In a world functioning 
deterministically, i f  we knew everything about all the forces operating, 
we could predict the future thinking and behaviour of every animal other 
than ourselves precisely - and this is what we are starting to find in 
practice already.
So how should we act if  our thoughts and behaviour are already totally 
determined - even the very thought that our thoughts and behaviour are 
already totally determined? How can we choose i f  the choice has already 
been programmed into us?
The empirical fact is that, in a world functioning deterministically, we do 
not choose or decide from some kind of independent, homuncular 
viewpoint. The process of choosing or other form of decision-making is 
simply a process of interaction between the various inputs entering the 
brain seconds, minutes, hours, days and years before, right back to the 
moment of its  f irs t existence, the process also involving the 
psychological properties of the brain at the particular moment concerned. 
The person himself, although he is an individual conscious entity, 
nevertheless has no independent, homuncular power whatsoever to 
manipulate the thought process and produce a different output from 
exactly the same inputs and psychological properties of the brain, i.e., 
bring about a different choice or decision from that determined by the 
inputs and the psychological properties of the brain. In a world functioning 
deterministically, there is no way that the output can be changed other 
than by change to the inputs or the psychological properties of the brain.
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Which poses what amounts now to a standardised question; i f  a person 
were himself to know everything about all the forces operating and 
determining his behaviour at a particular instant regarding a particular 
matter, including everything about his own particular psychological 
attributes, then would he not be able to predict exactly what the forces 
were going to determine and consequently be able to decide to do 
something else, thereby demonstrating freedom of choice?
This is merely yet another case of the 'l i t t le  man in the brain' syndrome. 
The input that makes a person decide to do something other than what he 
thinks he is predetermined to do is merely one of the forces which 
determine what he actually does. A person does not 'change his mind*. His 
mind, i.e., the state of his brain, is changed for him by a new conditioning 
force coming into play or by one of the existing forces being strengthened 
or weakened by some conditioning force changing.
This all being the case, i t  is apparent that, in a world functioning 
deterministically, the only way in which the mode of behaviour changes is 
by change to the forces which determine that mode. Given exactly the 
same innate psychological attributes, environmental conditioning and 
circumstances as Einstein, any other person would have come to exactly 
the some Theory of Relativity at exactly the same time. Given exactly the 
same psychological attributes, environmental conditioning and 
circumstances as A1 Capone, any other person would have committed 
exactly the same murders at exactly the same time. It is well-known that, 
given the same circumstances, a criminal is very likely to commit the 
same crime again unless his psychological attributes or the particular 
circumstances have somehow changed to a significant extent in the 
meantime.
Once again, we can re-phrase Newton's Law of Motion and say that every 
human being always acts in a specific, predetermined way unless 
conditioned by a new force to change that way. Which also means that 
there is no escape for anyone ever. Every human being is totally and 
always a prisoner of the past.
We see from all this why Darrow, the defending counsel at the famous 
Tennessee monkey tr ia l, was driven to the conclusion, after numerous 
cases as counsel for the defence, that the seeds of all criminal behaviour 
are to be found in the forces which have determined a person’s outlook in 
the past and that, in most cases, the adult criminal is already to be seen 
in the child and in the particular circumstances, i f  one looks deeply 
enough w ith enough expertise. He had observed this fact, time and time
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again, in preparing his submissions - that the defendant had come to be 
the way he was and to act the way he did as a result of forces acting upon 
him. In the end, Darrow was constrained to put his observations into a 
book.(2)
Not that such insight would have achieved much more in court than a 
lighter sentence for his client. The basic problems of morality, crime and 
punishment remained at the time and s t i l l  remain. Moralists, 
criminologists and judges are constantly beset by the problem of deciding 
the extent of responsibility in the committing of a crime against the laws 
of society and how to deal w ith anti-social behaviour in general. 
Extenuating circumstances, he did not know what he was doing, he knew 
the difference between right and wrong (a sim plistic statement i f  ever 
there was one), he was under the influence of alcohol - these are the 
sim plistic phrases that can and do decide whether someone is sent to gaol 
or executed, is committed to an asylum for the insane or walks from the 
courtroom a free man again. And sometimes so-called experts are called 
to the stand in an attempt to resolve the question of responsibility - often 
only to confuse i t  even more with conflicting opinion.
The reason would appear to stem quite clearly from the deterministic 
nature of human affairs. In a world functioning deterministically, there is 
no such thing as a division between the realm where a person is 
responsible for his actions and the realm where he is not. He is what he is 
at the time of a crime and what he is at that time is the sum total effect 
of all the external forces which combined together to bring about his 
action at that moment. The choice that he seemingly makes between 
lawful and unlawful behaviour is already tota lly determined by the 
properties of the brain which have come down to him from his forbears, by 
the particular influences which have conditioned his brain and thereby his 
outlook since birth and by the particular circumstances existing at the 
time when the choice was seemingly made. There is no other factor and 
not one of the factors is of his or her own making.
There are many ways in which circumstances can change the acceptability 
of individual behaviour to society. A psychologically weak person, in 
addition perhaps highly indoctrinated by a religious or political upbringing 
that instils  unquestioning acceptance of the authority's pronouncements, 
may well lead a blameless life  in the eyes of that authority and of 
everyone else should events fa ll out that way .
It would be seen as a different kind of life  entirely, in the eyes of a 
victim, should the burning of a heretic or gassing of a Jew be a required
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oct on the word of the authority. But the k ille r would s t ill go home 
afterwards seeing himself deserving of approbation.
On the other hand, a psychologically strong person, in addition brought up 
in an environment that instils a strong distrust of any kind of 
indoctrination whatsoever except that of an attitude of critica l inquiry, 
may well lead a life  which is constantly regarded by others as 
reprehensible should circumstances be such that conformity is the 
accepted way of life  of the time.
It would be seen as a different kind of life  entirely, in the eyes of those 
same conformists, should circumstances change and rebelliousness 
become laudable as the only means of combating tyrannical authority. The 
unpopular rocker of the boat become its  heroic saviour overnight.
The recent installation into positions of highest authority of East Europe 
freedom thinkers who for many years previously had been outcasts in their 
own countries is a remarkable example of this.
There have been many such cases throughout human history and many of 
the cases have involved the intelligentsia of a country. Students one day 
non-conforming upstarts and a tria l to society; another day, front-line 
fighters against the excesses of a despotic regime and the f irs t to die.
Recent notable cases were those of the East Europe and China uprisings by 
democracy-seeking students.
Individual men such as Akhenaten, Socrates, Jesus, Luther, Galileo and 
Darwin, all regarded as dangerous subverters by their own unenlightened 
generations, were all estimed greatly by later generations which by then 
had acquired something akin to the same level of understanding. 
Knowledge inevitably occurring in one person ahead of all others, 
sometimes so far ahead and apart that his life  is fo rfe it in their 
resistance to any idea which threatens the status quo. That resistance 
stemming in its  turn from childhood indoctrination by parents, peers and 
community authority as to what is right and what is wrong and each 
person seeing himself as a highly virtuous ’defender of the faith ', but each 
person, in reality merely a puppet in the hands of the previous generations 
which had indoctrinated him in that particular way. Thus, both the thinker 
and those who resist the new thinking are but elements in the 
deterministic process and no question of religious morality is relevant.
We can see why human thinking has never been able to reach precise
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definitions of perfect individual and community behaviour. Always there 
is need to allow for exceptions and/or extenuating circumstances but no 
way of specifying exact lim its  for those exceptions and extenuating 
circumstances. The soldier during war who obeys an order from an officer 
to k ill a civilian and is later charged w ith murder by the victorious side. 
The government that has to decide between the greatest good for the 
greatest number and the rights of minorities. The man who k ills  an 
intruder who is threatening him with death and his w ife w ith rape but is 
charged with manslaughter on the grounds of excessive retaliation. The 
woman who is pushed out of a lifeboat to drown because she is much the 
heaviest person aboard and the lifeboat is on the point of being swamped 
in a storm. The man who steals to feed his starving family when there is 
no other way and others have more than they need - perhaps because they 
have worked harder.
Thes are obvious cases where there is a d iff icu lt question of morality or 
ideal behaviour, quite apart from any legal question. And there are a vast 
number of other such cases where philosophers could argue interminably 
without ever agreeing upon a solution.
Church organisations which profess special authority in the fie ld are 
constantly forced into imaginative sophistry, facile shifting of ground and 
grudging compromise as less regimented thought moves well ahead of 
them and fina lly prevails.
The intellectual d ifficu lties outlined above in the case of progressive 
thought conflicting with conservative thought and in the case of moral 
dilemmas are well enough recognised but their relationship to the 
deterministic functioning of the world in general and the brain in 
particular is not.
The relationship between conditioning and the evolution of human thought 
can be further clarified by considering the situation that, i f  we delete M l 
conditioning, i.e., ML sensory inputs to the cognitive part of the brain, we 
are not even the organism that was potentially the person Helen Keller. 
She or ‘i f  was at least an organism which was conditioned by the internal 
bodily needs of th irs t and hunger etc. But what i f  those stimuli and 
responses had also been totally removed from cognitive awareness by 
some form of surgical operation? What would then have been le ft?  The 
question is highly significant since what would have been le ft would have 
contained everything that could be held to be independent of the 
conditioning process and potentially survivable after complete senility or 
death.
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The answer appears to be Inescapable - nothing of any permanent 
individual nature whatsoever exists i f  no sensory input of any kind, i.e., no 
conditioning of any kind, has ever occurred. The subject of conditioning is 
therefore one w ith profound implications as to the constitution of 
individuality and the constitution of mind and being. The subject was 
examined from a slightly different point of view in section 8.4 above.
There are those who would be quick to assert that, while the above 
analysis is perhaps valid as far as the conditioning and consequent 
'individuality* of others is concerned, self-conditioning is a phenomenon 
which implies permanent individuality of some independent, dualistic 
kind. The line of argument would be a variation of the standard one in 
which so-called incorrig ib ility  is held to be indicative of dualistic 
relationships.
In the case of self-conditioning, the argument would be that, for 
self-conditioning to occur, there has to be a 'self* which both carries out 
the conditioning and is conditioned, i.e., a mixing of subject and object 
which can only be explained by the existence of an independent subject. 
Consequently, i t  would be held to be an a priori truth that an independent 
'self' exists i f  self-conditioning exists.
The argument that self-reference has any fundamental significance was 
rejected in PART III on the grounds of there being no logical basis for 
differentiating fundamentally between the stimulus-response process 
linking the central processing or cognitive part of the brain to the world 
external to the body and the stimulus-response process linking the central 
processing or cognitive part of the brain w ith the other parts of the body. 
Similar reasoning is applicable in the case of self-conditioning; there is 
no fundamental difference between the conditioning of others and the 
conditioning of 'oneself in a monistic, deterministically functioning 
world. Exactly the same stimulus-response process is involved, the 
central processing activ ity merely being directed towards the functioning 
of the other parts of the body rather than towards the functioning of the 
world bevond the body.
The misinterpretation is once again sourced in that most common of all 
misconceptions - that of the 'l i t t le  man in the brain' - the 'self' that 
supposedly both carries out the conditioning and is conditioned. Discard 
that misconception on the grounds that i t  is entirely unsupported by the 
empirical evidence - which is solely to the effect that the brain is a 
single entity - and the difference between the conditioning of others and
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the conditioning of oneself is seen to be merely a different sequence of 
deterministically related events.
The question of the difference between conditioning and self-conditioning 
is perhaps of negligible importance compared to the question of the mode 
of incidence of conditioning of the thinking and behaviour of other human 
beings in the f irs t place. The answer is once again only to be found in the 
evolutionary process and ultimately only in the nominal f irs t  state. 
Survival of a group of animals would have been promoted by cooperation 
between the members of the group and the most effective cooperation 
would be that when all members of the group act in the most effective 
manner. The development of intelligence to the point of cooperation was a 
major step in the evolutionary mechanism of survival and i t  would have 
been a small further evolutionary step advantageous to survival for the 
members of a group to react angrily to failure on the part of others of the 
group to carry out that cooperation effectively. Such a reaction would be 
the source of the urge to condition the behaviour of others and ultimately 
of oneself, it  could also have been the source of the development of 
effective speech communication and the s t il l further development of the 
sense of self.
In other words, Sellar’s positing of the mode of incidence of 
self-awareness in the evolution of man is more than an adequate positing 




The human outlook of the 20th century has already evolved much further 
from that of the 19th century than is generally recognised even though 
evidence of the extent of the change and of the trend to what can only be 
called the deterministic outlook is to be found in many areas of human 
thinking and behaviour today.
One of the most affected areas has been that of interpersonal 
relationships. These are currently undergoing something of a 
transformation; an objective outlook based upon unconscious and 
conscious recognition of the truth of the principle of determinism is 
becoming much more characteristic of those relationships than ever 
before. A number of papers have been w ritten examining tfce possible 
consequences of such a trend in the light of that recognition and, by their 
very occurrence, are evidence of what is occurring in this area of the 
human outlook. Papers by Strawson,(1) Ayer/2) Bennett^ and Wolf^4) have 
provided an in itia l analysis of the trend and its  possible future 
consequences.
Strawson initiated the discussion and formulated the project as follows; 
"The question we have to ask is: What effect would, or should, the 
acceptance of the truth of a general thesis of determinism have upon 
these reactive attitudes? More specifically, would, or should, the 
acceptance of the truth of the thesis lead to the decay or the repudiation 
of all such attitudes? Would, or should, i t  mean the end of gratitude, 
resentment, and forgiveness; of all reciprocated adult loves; of all the 
essentially personal antagonisms?"^
Strawson answers his own question with the assertion that "This, then, is 
a part of the reply to our question. A sustained objectivity of 
inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation which that would entail, 
does not seem to be something of which human beings vv'ould be capable, 
even if  some general truth were a theoretical ground for it."(6)
Ayer disputes Strawson’s claim; "Even so, I think that he reaches his 
conclusion too easily, and my ground for this charge lies in his avoidance 
of any discussion of the general thesis of determinism. I hope to show 
that the content which i t  is reasonable to attach to the thesis is not so 
irrelevant to his arguments as he supposes i t  to be."(7)
However, after analysing the question along this line, Ayer finds himself 
unable to escape from a dilemma. "From this i t  appears to follow that I
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should set myself to cultivate an objective attitude towards myself and 
others, and to welcome an ordering of society in which i t  was generally 
prevalent. What should concern me morally would be just the beneficence 
of the conditioning. At the same time I have to confess that the prospect 
of any such Brave New World repels me. Why i t  should do so is not clear to 
me."(8)
Bennett and Wolf show sim ilar perplexity. They are both unable to discern 
how the conflict between participative emotional attitudes and the 
objective attitude towards others is likely to be resolved. Bennett can see 
no way out other than that expressed in the statement that "If our lives 
are to have a measure of warmth and engagement and spontaneity, we 
must pay the price of sometimes not acting in the prudent or fortunate 
way."^ and Wolf goes even further along this road of disquiet when she 
says "If, despite the knowledge that this is our status ((i.e., that we are 
beings tota lly controlled by the processes of determinism)), we choose to 
retain our reactive attitudes, we choose to live as i f  we were a kind of 
being that we know we are not. In doing this, we choose something akin to 
se lf-deception."^
What is starkly apparent in the deliberations by Strawson etc is the very 
readiness, at this point of time, to go into the matter of the likely effect 
upon the human outlook of the principle of determinism. Fairly clearly, we 
are well 'down the track' towards general acceptance of the principle.
The deterministic source both of this trend to increasing objectivity in 
the human outlook and to conscious awareness of the trend as shown by 
the papers by Strawson etc is to be found in the ever increasing scientific 
knowledge of the deterministic springs of human thought and behaviour. 
Not merely psychiatrists but an increasingly large segment of the human 
race is now thinking and acting - s till unconsciously for the most part, it  
is true - on the basis that determinism is true in the realm of human 
behaviour. The parent who sends his or her child to a particular school or 
church so that the child w ill be conditioned in a particular way for the 
rest of his thinking life ; the physician who prescribes a particular drug 
and the surgeon who carries out a particular operation to alter the state 
of the brain and thereby behaviour in a particular way; the dictator or the 
demagogue who masterminds the outlook and thereby the behaviour of the 
populace in a particular way; the person who knows the personal 
characteristics of another person very well and uses that knowledge, 
Svengali-like, to manipulate the thought process and behaviour of that 
other person in a particular way; the community which ascribes indirect 
responsibility for what is considered reprehensible behaviour, e.g., a host
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held responsible for drunken driving by a guest or parents held responsible 
for irresponsible behaviour by a child; all of these cases, and many more, 
are indicative of at least unconscious acceptance of the truth of 
determinism. The concept of a 'self' w ith individual properties beyond 
those imparted by phylogenetic and environmental forces has steadily and 
inexorably been losing any semblance of credibility.
The change has been promoted by the increasing disappearance of the 
individual human being into the one highly structured and unified social 
organisation, as noted by Adorno and HorkheimeK11) and consolidated by 
the ever-widening and ever-deepening mainstream of objective scientific 
knowledge which has now reached the point of dominating the intellectual 
activities and relationships of mankind almost as i f  the human race is 
l i t t le  more than a collection of robots responding to the commands of a 
computer master-mind.
The incidence of the deterministic form of outlook as a further 
development of the objective form is evidenced by the readiness of the 
distressed, the inadequate and the intent to turn to psychiatrists, 
psychologists and psychotherapists for radical modification of their own 
character tra its  - thereby evidencing how far human thinking has already 
progressed in accepting, consciously or unconsciously, the truth of 
determinism in the realm of human behaviour and applying that truth in 
practice. As scientific knowledge regarding the forces which determine 
human thinking and behaviour continues to become more complete and 
precise, awareness of that knowledge continues to increasingly permeate 
the human outlook and itse lf increasingly become one of the forces 
determining thinking and behaviour. Increasing knowledge leading to 
increasing awareness of the deterministic forces operating and increasing 
awareness becoming a conditioning force in its  own right.
Which is to say that the human outlook is passing from the almost tota lly 
subjective form wherein involvement in the external world - in other 
people and in the environment - was almost totally participative and 
non-objective, through the objective form wherein the behaviour of others 
is recognised as being deterministically caused, to the ultimate 
deterministic form wherein it  is accepted, consciously or unconsciously, 
that one's own individual tra its, thinking and behaviour are tota lly 
determined by external forces and that change in those tra its , thinking and 
behaviour can only occur as a consequnce of change in the external forces.
There is l i t t le  escape from the conclusion that the evolution of the human 
outlook has already reached something of a deterministic form and there
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is no reason to believe that the evolutionary forces w ill not continue to 
operate in the same direction and ultimately bring about a comprehensive 
deterministic system of thought. This would inevitably involve 
considerable change in the nature of interpersonal relationships.
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9.5 Religion
The realm of religious belief is well-known to be the realm wherein 
human thought diverges furthest from sound analytic analysis, the 
pertinent empirical evidence and just plain commonsense and there is 
l i t t le  doubt that the realm w ill be the last to be transformed by the truth 
of any such theories as those of determinism, monism and identity.
Speculation, aided and abetted by emotion, w ill continue to find ways to 
ju s tify  the claim that self-hood is somehow an eternal state in some 
after-death form . One such way is that of claiming that individuality and 
self-hood are transformed after death into some kind of spiritual form 
approximating but entirely independent of the form during life . Any such 
theory would avoid the restrictions by determinism, monism and the 
identity theory and give free rein to satisfying belief in some kind of 
a fte r-life  heaven but i t  would do so only by rejecting both the analytic 
arguments and the vast amount of consistent empirical evidence which do 
not support any such speculation.
The mode of sourcing of such speculation can also be examined to 
determine its  deterministic origin and thereby perhaps further question 
its  validity. In a world functioning deterministically, all concepts and 
beliefs, including religious concepts and beliefs, are deterministic 
outcomes of the innate reasoning capability of the brain, the empirical 
data that comes to the brain via the sensory organs and the emotional 
drives which are an innate part of the human psyche. The concepts and 
beliefs are therefore sourced entirely in the distant and immediate past 
and reflect nothing but the phylogenetic and environmental forces 
appertaining at a particular point in the evolutionary history of the 
individual and of mankind.
We see this in the history of religious concepts and beliefs. Each has been 
an outcome of the particular circumstances appertaining at the time - 
emotional need underlying every religious concept that has ever been put 
forward but every religious concept reflecting the state of knowledge 
regarding the Universe and the human world at the particular time.
During the period when the demands of survival and daily life  dictated the 
whole of man's outlook, religious concepts could scarcely have taken any 
other form than that of postulating anthropomorphic beings which 
controlled the forces of nature and dispensed largesse or disaster upon 
the human world, both during life  and during some supposed 'happy hunting 
ground' after life. The ingredients for any other concept were simply not
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available and, in ony cose, the concepts satisfied the emotional need for a 
continuation of the child-parent relationship with its  aura of protection 
in the face of a harsh and threatening world. Characteristics of 
protectiveness, annoyance and responsiveness to supplication were 
ascribed to the 'gods' exactly the same as those actually displayed by 
parents.
Obviously, l i t t le  has changed for the great majority of human beings 
during the whole of prehistory and historical time - only the replacement 
of the concept of a multitude of gods by the monotheistic concept. There 
is s t il l a deep-seated emotional need to look to some kind of protective 
father-figure for comfort in the face of the mysteries and disasters of 
life. We are all, in many ways, s t ill children afraid of the dark and the 
most childish among us are those who are the most dependent-upon belief 
in an all-powerful father-figure.
The factors which have held mankind to such a low level of religious 
conception are only now being outweighed by the empirical evidence and 
the concept of a paternalistic god is only now being replaced by the f irs t 
outline of a universal sp iritua lity or psychic commonality of some kind 
without any anthropomorphic, personalised characteristics. Various 
versions of such a psychic commonality have already appeared, notably 
those of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Heisenberg and Schroedinger and, most 
recently, Honderich whose statements in this field are very much in line 
with the conclusions of the present study in the field of religion, " if a 
determinism is true, it  may be said, i cease to be a triv ia l existence. I 
cease to be what by contrast with the universe is a momentary and 
insignificant thing, the antithesis of anything of grandeur. I can, through 
my perceived membership in nature - my relation to i t  is properly so 
described, rather than as an external relation - escape the mereness of 
myself. I escape an isolation from the natural world. In place of tr iv ia lity  
and isolation, I can identify with the greatest of realities. There is the 
satisfactory possibility, further, of having a certain view of my own 
species and its  history, a view which brings i t  together w ith other 
species and so rises over a petty anthropocentrism. Determinism, 
therefore, may be claimed to be far from being 'the hideous hypothesis' 
(Hampshire, 1951, p. 179) and in fact the source of a deep satisfaction."^
The trend towards belief in an atheistic universal sp iritua lity  or psychic 
commonality of some kind, consistent w ith a monistic structure of the 
Universe, is evident.
It is no part of the scope of the present study to develop the belief into a
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comprehensive religious system but we can be assured that such a system 
will sooner or la ter  come into existence as an outcome of the increasing 
empirical knowledge and understanding.
1 1 2
PART V CONCLUSION
The project set out ot the commencement of the study was to establish a 
theory of consciousness, being and knowable reality that is fu lly 
consistent w ith all the relevant analytic arguments and empirical 
evidence. It was considered that such a theory would be on extension of 
the traditional Identity Theory and the f irs t part of the study was 
directed to recapitulating and strengthening the case put forward for that 
theory.
In this regard, i t  was noted that the traditional Identity Theory is very 
largely directed to establishing that the statement that a 'mental* state 
is identical to a 'physical' state is devoid of inconsistency and refers 
l i t t le  to the particular scientific and other empirical evidence which 
points to the truth of the theory. As a result, a review of such evidence 
followed in PART III of the study and this led to the conclusion that three 
principles are particularly significant in the structure and functioning of 
the Universe and thereby in any attempt to formulate a comprehensive 
theory of consciousness, being and knowable reality.
It was also particularly noted that there are substantial objections to the 
widespread belief w ithin philosophy that quantum phenomena are evidence 
of an element of some kind of ontological indeterminacy in the functioning 
of the sub-atomic realm and reference was made to a uniquely 
authoritative group of scientists and philosophers - Einstein, Planck, 
Bohm, Hawking, Schroedinger, Russell and Honderich particularly notable 
among them - who do not agree with that belief.
The three principles identified were those as follows:
1. The principle of deterministic necessity, i.e., determinism, which 
states, on an epistemological basis, that 'If p then q', and, on an 
ontological basis, that the Universe can be fu lly represented by a 
mathematical expression with time as the only variable.
2. The principle of monism which states that only the one knowable entity 
or system was sourced in the Big Bang, the primary plasma state, a 
'singularity' or whatever else is taken to be the primary state of the 
Universe.
3. The principle of conservation of energy which states that energy is 
always conserved in the functioning of the monistic entity or system that 
is the Universe according to 2. above.
Further, i t  was argued that the notion of cause has only lim ited 
significance in the case of a universe functioning deterministically since
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the transition from state p to state q of such a universe, on the basis of If 
p then q, does not require any explanation as to why q when p. Nor can a 
complete explanation be forthcoming in terms only of p since, in a system 
functioning deterministically, the source of the forces which occasion 
the change of state from p to q is to be found only in the ‘f irs t cause*. 
Further, since the traditional concept of the 'f irs t cause' as involving 
something originating in total nothing or something created by a deist god 
would appear very strongly to be merely a nonsense or imaginative, 
unrealistic and unsupported speculation, the question of the source of the 
forces involved in the evolution of the Universe was truncated, for the 
purposes of the study, to the moment immediately prior to the Big Bang, 
the moment of the primary plasma state, a 'singularity' or whatever else 
is taken to be the primary state of the Universe. The state of the Universe 
at that particular moment was designated as the nominal f its t  state of 
everything that followed.
In accordance with this truncating, all states of the Universe - and 
therefore all states of the human world - are deterministically related 
back to that nominal f irs t state.
As a corollary of the three principles, i t  was argued, firs t, that the 
fundamental structure and functioning of the Universe accords with what 
most appropriately could be called the theory of deterministic monism 
and, second, that the traditional Identity Theory should be replaced by a 
more comprehensive theory of consciousness, being and knowable reality 
which takes fu ll account of the analytic arguments and the empirical 
evidence. That more comprehensive theory was termed the deterministic 
identity theory on the grounds that determinism and the identity thesis 
are the most significant elements underlying the theory.
According to the deterministic identity theory, the brain is a totally 
reductive entity, its  holistic properties being identically holistic 
properties of every level of constitution, including the level that is a part 
of the fundamental 'substance' of the Universe.
Further, i t  was noted that the mentalistic reportings of the brain, i.e., all 
forms of 'experience' or consciousness, are a priori reportings as f irs t 
espoused by Descartes in his statement "I think therefore I am." but that 
physicalistic properties are only the contingent properties by which 
cognitive consciousness picks out the external world - including that part 
of the external world that is conscious and has the contingent 
physicalistic properties which are involved in its  being picked out as the 
brain.
Particular attention was given in PART IV to the question of what is 
self-hood or l-ness in the light of the empirical evidence. Based upon the 
empirical evidence, two important claims were made - f irs t, the 
non-existence of any fundamental distinction between cognitive 
consciousness or awareness of the external world and self-awareness or 
the sense of self, i.e., awareness of one's own body and one's own thinking. 
It was claimed that cognitive consciousness is identical to the state of 
the brain following upon sensory interaction w ith the external world and 
involving merely awareness of the external world and of interaction with 
that world. The sense of self was claimed to be merely an extension of 
the same process, being identical to a state of the brain when this 
includes frontal lobes as an effective integral part.
Second, it  was claimed that individuality is only a peripheralistic, 
transitory property of reality and that permanence is only logically to be 
found in some kind of underlying psychic commonality of everything that 
is a part of the Universe. Reference was made to philosophers who have 
already propounded variations of this particular theory.
It was also anticipated in PART IV that conscious and unconscious 
acceptance of the truth of determinism, monism and the identity theory, 
i.e., of the truth of a theory such as that of the deterministic identity 
theory, would entail considerable change in the human outlook, in human 
affairs and in the scope and direction of philosophical analysis - notably, 
in areas of conditioning, self-conditioning and responsibility such as 
those of education, interpersonal relationships, psychotherapy, morality, 
crime, punishment, law, etc, etc including, as a special problem in 
philosophical analysis, the problem of how to take fu ll account of the 
deterministic sourcing of our own thinking. This was the problem noted in 
section 9.3 as involving Godel's Incompleteness Theorem and which could 
also involve analysis further along the line of that of the present study.
It was further noted that there is already a definite trend in the direction 
of all these changes as a consequence of the deterministic relationships 
already apparent in a number of fields and i t  was claimed that the trend 
can only become more apparent and more consolidated as the 
deterministic relationships become ever more widely understood and 
accepted. It was finally concluded that a new kind of human being and a 
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